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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELAINE S. SORENSEN,
Plaintiff, Respondent and
Cross-Petitioner,

:
:
:
:

vs.

:

CLIFFORD G. SORENSEN,

Cert No. 890145
Priority No. 13

:
:
:
:

Defendant, Appellant and
Petitioner.

Court of Appeals
No. 870102-CA

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an action for divorce.

It was tried in the

district court, and an appeal was taken to the Utah Court of
Appeals.

Both parties petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for

writs of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENT FOR REVIEW
Issues On Petition
1.

Is the value of the goodwill of a professional

dental proprietorship a divisible marital asset upon divorce?
2.

Does the district court's valuation of the dental

practice constitute a clear abuse of its discretion?
3.

Does the district court's award of expenses for

expert witnesses constitute a clear abuse of its discretion?

0l3090.mb.relbnefjor
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Issues on Cross-Petition
1.

Is the district courtfs award of attorney's fees

to Mrs. Sorensen supported both by evidence and by a stipulation
at trial between the parties?
2.

Is Mrs. Sorensen entitled to attorney's fees for

defending the appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals?
LAW DETERMINATIVE OF REVIEW
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Nature of the Case
This is an action for divorce and an equitable
distribution of the marital assets.
The Course of Proceedings
Elaine S. Sorensen filed her complaint on March 22,
1985, in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County,
Utah.

The complaint was amended on March 12, 1986.

The action

was tried by Judge Rodney S. Page, without a jury, on October 27
and November 14, 1986.

On February 24, 1987, the district court

entered a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage between the
parties and dividing the marital assets.
On March 24, 1987, Clifford G. Sorensen appealed to the
Utah Court of Appeals, challenging the district court's property
valuation and distribution, award of attorney's fees to Mrs.
Sorensen, and the division of expert witness fees.
013090.mb.KLbriefjor
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The Court of

Appeals filed its opinion on February 10, 1989.

The opinion is

reported at Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989),
cert, granted, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989).
Disposition in the Court Below
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the district
court's ruling (the property distribution and the division of
expert witness fees) and reversed in part (the award of
attorney's fees).

Dr. Sorensen then petitioned the Supreme Court

for a writ of certiorari.

Mrs. Sorensen filed a cross-petition.

Both petitions were granted, and this appeal followed.
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Dr. Sorensen's brief contains a long statement of
facts.

Mrs. Sorensen flatly disputes many of the statements and

she believes others unfairly characterize the parties' marital
history, their accumulation of assets, and the relative
contributions of the parties.

Nevertheless, Mrs. Sorensen will

forego extended debate because those statements are largely
irrelevant.

The limited issues raised by the appeal permit a

more brief recitation of the relevant facts.

It is sufficient to

note the following:

These abbreviations are used throughout: The record on
appeal, as paginated by the district court clerk, is designated
"R"; the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered by
Judge Rodney S. Page on February 24, 1987, are designated
"Findings" or "Conclusions"; the Decree of Divorce, entered by
Judge Page on February 24, 1987, is designated "Decree"; the
transcript of the first day of trial is designated "Tr. Vol. I";
the transcript of the second day of trial is designated "Tr. Vol.
II"; and the parties' trial exhibits are designated "Tr. Ex."
013090.mb.reLbriefjsor
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The parties were married on April 10, 1975 and remained
husband and wife for nearly 11 years until their divorce in
February, 1987.

They had four children at the time of trial

(three boys, then 10, 9 and 6; and one girl, then age 3) whose
custody was awarded to Mrs. Sorensen.

(Tr. Vol. I at 105).

Dr. Sorensen is a successful dentist who at the time of
trial had practiced in Roy, Utah, for 16 years.

From the time of

their marriage until the summer of 1976, when their first child
was born, Mrs. Sorensen worked as a nurse and provided financial
support to the marriage.

Over the next seven years she worked

periodically in nursing positions, and she kept and maintained
the home of the parties and cared for the four children.

After

the birth of the fourth child in 1983, Mrs. Sorensen was not
regularly employed outside the home, other than to work with her
husband in the dental practice.

She worked both part-time and

full-time to keep the office records and to collect receivables,
and she assisted Dr. Sorensen in planning business strategies.
(Tr. Vol. I at 105-107).
Among the many witnesses at trial were three called by
the parties to value Dr. Sorensen's dental practice.
Austin testified for Mrs. Sorensen.

Dr. Richard

Dr. Austin is a dentist who

had practiced in the Salt Lake City and Park City areas for four
and one-half years.

He had also acted for two and one-half years

as a broker for the sale and/or purchase of dental practices.

He

was associated with Paul Sletten & Associates, a Denver based
company which had been actively engaged for over eighteen years
013<m.mb.relbriefjor
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in the appraising, selling and buying of dental practices.
Before his participation in this case, Dr. Austin had appraised
twelve dental practices, personally brokered (purchased or sold)
eight practices within the State of Utah and been involved as a
consultant on others.

He knew of no one in the State of Utah

with his professional background who brokered dental practices.
(Tr. Vol. I at 59-65).
Dr. Austin presented to the court a written valuation
of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice.

(Tr. Ex. D ) . The Exhibit and

his valuation of the practice were based upon information
supplied earlier by Dr. Sorensen in his answers to
interrogatories and upon Dr. Austin's experience as a dentist and
broker.

(Tr. Vol. I at 68).

Dr. Austin noted that, "It is

important to realize that this evaluation has been made with the
standards that are currently acceptable for this purpose.
Existing market trends in the State of Utah for the disposition
of dental practices were given consideration."

(Tr. Ex. D at 2).

Dr. Austin valued the overall practice by calculating
the value of three components.

(Tr. Vol. I at 66-76).

The first

was "tangible assets," including furniture and equipment, for
example.

He valued those assets at $15,330.

(Tr. Vol. I at 68).

The second component was "accounts receivable."

He excluded all

accounts unpaid for over 120 days, then discounted by 12% the
total of those accounts then outstanding for no more than 120
days to allow for uncollectible accounts.

In this fashion he

valued the accounts receivable at $22,170 as of October 21, 1986,
OU(m.mb.Td.bnefjsor
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one week before trial.

(Tr. Vol. I at 69).

The third component

was "intangible assets," which included the "goodwill" of Dr.
Sorensen's practice.

Dr. Austin took the receipts and expenses

of Dr. Sorensenfs practice for three years and then calculated
the average revenues over the period; that figure was $184,000.
(Tr. Vol. I at 70).

He discounted that figure by 66% to reflect

an actual sale to a prospective buyer and to reflect his
assumption that Dr. Sorensen would assist in the transfer of
ownership but thereafter would no longer be associated with the
practice.

(Tr. Vol. I at 70-76, 83). He calculated $62,560 as

the total value of the intangibles.

When added together, the

three components constituted Dr. Austin's total valuation of Dr.
Sorensen's dental practice:

$100,060.

(Tr. Ex. D ) .

Two accountants, Gerald Deters and Roger Nuttall,
testified for Dr. Sorensen.

Mr. Deters calculated the net income

of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice in 1974 (before the parties'
marriage) and in 1986 (after separation), and concluded the
practice in 1974 was "a little bit bigger, a little better" than
at the time of trial.

(Tr. Vol. I at 287-289).

Mr. Nuttall

testified that Dr. Austin's valuation of the dental practice
should be reduced by $10,129 to reflect existing accounts
payable.

(Tr. Vol. II at 23).

He believed the practice was well

established in 1974, that Dr. Sorensen was then earning a median
salary, and that neither of those conditions changed appreciably
during the marriage.

0l3Q90.mb.reLbnefjaor
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The district court took the matter under advisement.
It made a ruling on January 5, 1987.
believed the testimony of Dr. Austin.
of the practice to be $100,000.

(R. 65-78).

The court

It found the total value

(R. 82; Findings f 14). The

court discounted this figure by 10% because it also found that
dental practices usually sell for approximately 90% of their
appraised value.

(R. 82; Findings f 15). Then, because Dr.

Sorensen had been in practice for 16 years and the parties had
been married for 11 of those years, the court took ll/16ths (or
69%) of the $90,000 value, for a net sum of $62,100, representing
the value of Dr. Sorensen's practice.

(R. 87; Conclusions 5 7).

The district court ordered an essentially equal division of the
parties1 property.

The professional practice went to Dr.

Sorensen with an equalizing credit to Mrs. Sorensen (R. 97;
Decree f 26):
MRS. SORENSEN

DR. SORENSEN

Home
$100,000
Car
750
Furniture & fixtures
6,500
Piano
7,500
Guitar
160
Wolfcreek membership
1,000
Yard equipment
555
Camera
600
Pension plan interest
20.104
TOTAL

Dental Practice
*Farm
Farm equipment

Truck
Spa
*Dental Building
Piccolo
Computer
Motorcycles
Pension interest

$ 62,100

30,422
4,000
400
250
11,457
2,000
3,000
1,500
31.241

$136,369
TOTAL $146,370

Less equity interest
brought in

5.800
$131,369

Less equity interest
brought in

15.000

$131,370

013090.mb.KLbrufM>r
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*Farm
Contract Bienestar
Home Contract
TOTAL
Less
Balance

$ 78,200
19,165
42.000
$139,365
- 108.943
$30,422

*Dental Building
Less contract to
Thompsons
Less amount to
defendant's mother
Balance

$ 74,000
-

42,543

- 20.000
$ 11,457

The court ordered Dr. Sorensen to pay his own
attorney's fees and $2,000 towards his wife's fees.

It ordered

the parties to pay the expenses for their own expert witnesses.
It also ordered them to divide evenly the expenses of one expert,
Alan Heiskanen.

(R. 96; Decree 1 23).
ARGUMENT ON PETITION

Summary of Argument
The district court properly included the value of
goodwill in the overall valuation of Dr. Sorensen's dental
practice.

The court's valuation of the practice and the

subsequent allocation of the value between the parties does not
reveal a clear abuse of discretion.

In any event, Dr. Sorensen

did not object at trial and cannot now raise the issue on appeal
for the first time.
The parties agreed at the pretrial conference that the
district court would decide who should pay the expert witness
fees of Alan Heiskanen, a real estate appraiser.

QUm.mb.relbnefjor
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The court,

nevertheless, has discretion in a divorce case to award a needy
spouse the funds required to prosecute the action.

The fees of

an expert witness, similar to attorneyfs fees, fall within this
discretion.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY VALUED DR. SORENSEN'S DENTAL
PRACTICE.
Dr. Sorensen claims the property division was unfair.

He contends (his brief at 19-39) the district court improperly
valued his dental practice by including amounts for "goodwill"
and accounts receivable, but excluding any amount for accounts
payable.

He asks the Court to vacate the property division.
The argument is ill-founded.

The goodwill of a

professional proprietorship is a marital asset which is divisible
upon divorce.

The district court considered all of the available

evidence and, in its discretion, determined an overall value for
the dental practice.

Record evidence supports that

determination.
A.

"Goodwill" In A Professional Proprietorship Is A
Divisible Marital Asset.

Dr. Sorensen contends (his brief at 20-31) that, as a
matter of law, there is no goodwill in a professional dental
practice.

His argument is disarmingly simple.

It is not

persuasive, however, for at least three reasons.
1.

Dr. Sorensen Waived the Issue by Not
Objecting at Trial.

The issue of goodwill valuation was raised on the first
day of trial.

0l3090.mb.reLbriefjor

In an opening statement, Dr. Sorensen's lawyer,

9

Robert A. Echard, told the court that the valuation of Dr.
Sorensen's dental practice would be an issue.

(Tr. Vol. I at 4 ) .

Only hours later, Mrs. Sorensen's lawyer, Tim W. Healy, raised
the specific issue of "goodwill"

during direct examination of

her expert witness, Dr. Richard Austin.
Dr. Sorensen did not object.
issue.

(Tr. Vol. I at 70-72).

In fact, he actively litigated the

Dr. Sorensen called his own expert witnesses, Mr. Deters

and Mr. Nuttall, who gratuitously offered testimony about
goodwill, albeit to establish a different value.
321; Tr. Vol. II at 24).

(Tr. Vol. I at

Having failed to object at trial, Dr.

Sorensen may not raise the issue for the first time on appeal.
Rogers v. M. 0. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1033, 1034-35 (Utah
1987); Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1986).
2.

The Court of Appeals Followed Utah Law When It
Held the "Goodwill" of A Professional Practice is
A Divisible Marital Asset.

The Court of Appeals held the goodwill of a
professional practice is a marital asset subject to valuation and
distribution in appropriate circumstances.

Sorensen v. Sorensen,

769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989), cert, granted, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah
1989).

Dr. Sorensen contends the holding conflicts with three

prior opinions from this Court (Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076
. (Utah 1988); Doau v. Doau, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982); and Jackson
v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966)) and with one
prior opinion from the Court of Appeals (Stevens v. Stevens, 754
P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988)).

0UC90.mb.reLbntfjor
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The argument simply is not correct.

The Court of

Appeal's decision is thoroughly researched, well reasoned,
artfully written, and in harmony with Utah law and with the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which have considered the
issue.

A copy of the Sorensen opinion is included in Appendix A.
Dr. Sorensen has not accurately described any of the

four opinions mentioned in his brief.
opinion.

Consider first the Jackson

There, defendant claimed the goodwill of his former

business partnership was an asset and he was entitled to a share
of its value on dissolution.

415 P.2d at 668-69.

In resolving

the issue, the Supreme Court embraced what it then perceived as
the prevailing rule:2 a professional partnership does not have
goodwill to distribute as a firm asset on its dissolution.
at 670-71.
however.

Id.

The Court did not consider the rule absolute,
It noted there are decisions which reach a different

conclusion because of their particular facts and circumstances.

2

The original quotation taken by the Supreme Court over 24
years ago from American Jurisprudence was dropped from the
current volume of the encyclopedia. Compare 40 Am. Jur.
Partnership § 271, at 316 (1942), with 59A Am. Jur. 2d
Partnership § 338, at 413-414 (1987). American Jurisprudence
Second concedes that what once may have been considered the
"general rule" is not accepted now in most jurisdictions having
considered the issue and that the existence of goodwill in a
professional business is a question of fact, not law.
The Court would have been better served when deciding
Jackson if it had relied upon 24 Am. Jur. Good Will § 11, at 808
(1942). Section 11 correctly states that the goodwill of a
professional practice is a valuable, yet intangible, asset which
can be transferred. See also Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App.
2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (quoting and applying §
11).
0l3090.mb.nLbriefjor

11

Id. at 670. Accordingly, the Court said the general rule applies
in a business partnership,
unless the parties have in their partnership agreements
provided otherwise, or the facts and circumstances of
the particular case would require a modification of the
general rule.
Id.

(Emphasis added.)

The Court then reviewed the appeal record

to determine whether the disgruntled partner had established by a
preponderance of the evidence that his former partnership had an
asset of goodwill in which he was entitled to share.

Id. at 669.

The Court examined the parties1 prior business affairs,

It found

the partners had agreed not to carry goodwill as an asset on the
partnership books; at the time of dissolution they had valued the
business assets without consideration for goodwill; and, there
was not an adequate showing the partnership agreement
contemplated the use of goodwill to compute book value,,
671.

Id. at

The Court concluded "the weight of the evidence

preponderates that under the facts and circumstances of this
case" there was not goodwill in the old partnership for the
partner and, for that reason, the finding of the district court
was correct.

Id. at 671.

(Emphasis added.)

rule as a matter of law in Jackson.

The Court did not

It focused on the record

evidence, because the existence, valuation, and allocation of
goodwill are questions of fact.
Dr. Sorensen's reliance on Dogu is equally misplaced.
The facts of the case, the issues, even the dicta emphasized by

013090.mb.Klbnefjor
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Dr. Sorensen in his brief (at 22-23) —
issue of establishing goodwill.

none of these address the

Doau offers no guidance.

In Gardner, this Court squarely recognized goodwill as
a distributable marital asset.

There, the spouses wrestled with

the proper division of their marital assets, including a medical
clinic where the husband, a general surgeon, was employed.
parties valued the husband's interest in the clinic.

Both

The Court

noted that in the valuation process, neither party gave any
"consideration to the good will inherent in the professional
clinic."

Id.

at 1080. That observation was more fully

explained in a footnote:
A marriage may be analogized to a partnership.
Upon dissolution of the marital "partnership," an
equitable distribution should be based on consideration
of all assets, not just those that survive the trip to
the bottom of the balance sheet. Where appropriate,
value may be given to that 'something in business which
gives reasonable expectancy of preference in the race
of competition,' commonly known as good will. Jackson
v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 85, 415 P.2d 667, 670
(1966).
The ability of a business to generate income from
its continued patronage is commonly referred to as good
will. Good will is properly subject to equitable
distribution upon divorce. See, e.g., Duaan v. Duqan,
92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); Matter of Marriage of
Fleege, 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). But see
The Treatment of Good Will in Divorce Proceedings, 18
Fam.L.Q. 213 (1984).
Id. at 1080, n.l.

(Emphasis added.)

The Court of Appeals held goodwill to be a marital
asset in Stevens.

There, the wife contended the district court

had failed to value and distribute the farming and feed-hauling
operations pursued by the husband.
had an asset of goodwill.

She claimed the operations

The Court of Appeals held her claim

ii

failed on two grounds.

First, her expert witness had testified

that his appraisal utilized standard procedures for valuing
"going concern" businesses.

Thus, the wife's expert testimony

had confused "goodwill" with "going concern value."

Id. at 957.

Second, she failed to meet her burden of proof that the business
activities enjoyed the type of patronage or reputation found
within "goodwill."

Id. at 956-957.

The Court of Appeals prefaced its analysis with a brief
discussion of goodwill:
The presence of good will may be evidenced by proof of
an on-going competitive enterprise having continuity of
place and commercial name and enjoying a favorable
reputation founded upon prior sales of goods or
services. 38 Am.Jur.2d Good Will §§ 4-8 (1968). The
presence or absence of good will depends upon the facts
and circumstances of the particular case. See Jackson,
18 Utah 2d at 86-87, 415 P.2d at 670-71. Where
appropriate, the good will value of a business
enterprise is subject to equitable distribution.
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1080 n.l (Utah
1988) .
Id. at 956.

Thus, the existence of goodwill is a factual issue,

varying from case to case, and its value may be distributed when
appropriate.

The Court then noted at least one factual

circumstance which, if shown by evidence to the satisfaction of
the district court, could preclude the existence of goodwill:
There can be no good will in a business that is
dependent for its existence upon the individual who
conducts the enterprise and would vanish were the
individual to die, retire or quit work. Jackson, 18
Utah 2d at 86, 415 P.2d at 670.
Id. at 956.

In making this comment, the Court noted a factual

defense to litigants in the position of Dr. Sorensen:

Show that

your professional practice is dependent solely on you for its
existence and that it would vanish if you departed.
1 A

Dr. Sorensen

did not even attempt to prove these facts, or, if he did, the
district court simply was not persuaded.

Moreover, Dr. Austin,

the expert witness, appraised the dental practice as a sale and
as a consequence, drastically reduced the sale price by 66%. His
expert testimony assumed Dr. Sorensen would no longer be
associated with the practice.
In each of the four opinions cited by Dr. Sorensen,
Utah appellate courts have recognized goodwill as a marital asset
which may be valued and distributed upon divorce.

The Court of

Appeals decision in Sorensen is not contrary to Utah law.
It is important to notice that Jackson (and the
opinions noted in American Jurisprudence) deals exclusively with
the existence of goodwill in a professional business and its
division among associates upon dissolution of the business.

The

existence and apportionment of goodwill incident to a divorce are
treated differently, however.

A recent decision from the Arizona

Supreme Court highlights the distinction:
The confusion in this area of the law exists
partially because many of the cases concerning the
existence and evaluation of goodwill involve
partnership dissolution, and not marital dissolution.
Often the valuation of partnership assets, including
goodwill, is controlled by the partnership agreement.
In this case we are dealing with a marital dissolution
which does not affect the continuation of the business
partnership. The current situation is aptly described
as follows:
A professional practice goes automatically to the
spouse licensed to practice it. He is not selling out
or liquidating, but continuing in business.
Effectively, it is the case of the silent partner
withdrawing from a going business. And, if such
partner is to receive fair compensation for her share,
or her enforced retirement, it should be so evaluated.

i*

Brawman v. Brawman. 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 882, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 106, 109-10 (1962).
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (Ariz.
1987) .
It is essential to the proper review of this appeal to
focus on those opinions which address goodwill in the context of
a divorce.

If that is done, a distinct pattern emerges:

all but

one of the jurisdictions in the Pacific region which have
addressed the issue, hold goodwill in a professional business is
a marital asset divisible upon divorce.3

3

It is the favored rule

See, e.g.:

ARIZONA;
Mitchell v. Mitchell. 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208 (1987)
Carriker v. Carriker, 151 Ariz. 296, 727 P.2d 349 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986)
Wisner v. Wisner. 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981)
CALIFORNIA;
In Re Marriage of Fonstein, 17 Cal. 3d 738, 131 Cal. Rptr.
873, 552 P.2d 1169 (1976)
In Re Marriage of Watts. 171 Cal. App. 3d 366, 217
Cal. Rptr. 301 (Cal. App. Ct. 1985)
In Re Marriage of Fenton. 134 Cal. App. 3d 451, 184
Cal. Rptr. 597 (Cal App. Ct. 1982)
In Re Marriage of Slater. 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 160
Cal. Rptr. 686 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979)
In Re Marriage of Webb. 94 Cal. App. 3d 335, 156
Cal. Rptr. 334 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979)
In Re Marriage of Aufmuth. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152
Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979)
In Re Marriage of Foster. 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117
Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974)
In Re Marriage of Lopez. 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113
Cal. Rptr. 58 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974)
In Re Marriage of Fortier. 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109
Cal. Rptr. 915 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974)
Todd v. Todd. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131
(Cal. App. Ct. 1969)
Golden v. Golden. 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr.
735 (Cal. App. Ct. 1969)
Fritschi v. Teed. 213 Cal. App. 2d 718, 29 Cal. Rptr. 114
(continued...)
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(...continued)
(Cal. App. Ct. 1963)
Brawman v. Brawman. 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106
(Cal. App. Ct. 1962)
Mueller v. Mueller. 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90
(Cal. App. Ct. 1956)
Franklin v. Franklin. 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 637
(Cal. App. Ct. 1945)
COLORADO;
In Re Marriage of Nichols. 606 P.2d 1314 (Colo. Ct. App.
(1979)
MONTANA;
In Re Marriage of Hull. 712 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1986)
NEW MEXICO;
Hertz v. Hertz. 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 (1983)
Hurlev v. Hurley. 94 N.M. 651, 615 P.2d 256 (1980)
OREGON;
In Re Marriage of Goger. 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (Or.
Ct. App. 1976)
In Re Marriage of Steinbrenner. 60 Or. App. 106, 652 P.2d
845 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)
WASHINGTON;
In Re Marriage of Hall. 103 Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175
(1984)
Matter of Marriage of Fleege. 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d
1136 (1979)
In Re Marriage of Freedman. 23 Wash. App. 27, 592 P.2d 1124
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979)
In Re Marriage of Kaplan. 23 Wash. App. 503, 597 P.2d 439
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979)
In Re Marriage of Lukens. 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976)
The issue was presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in
Saviers v. Saviers. 92 Idaho 117, 438 P.2d 268 (1968). There the
wife appealed, alleging error by the trial court for its failure
to find and value her husband's interest in the good will of his
medical partnership. The Supreme Court found no error since the
trial transcript did not contain any evidence from which value
could be determined.
The Court of Appeals of Idaho has held the goodwill of a
family owned business (truck stop) is marital property which
should be valued and distributed upon divorce. The court
declined to resolve the issue in the context of a professional
practice. Carr v. Carr. 108 Idaho 684, 701 P.2d 304, n. 4 at 309
(Idaho App. 1985).
(continued...)
17

elsewhere, too.

3

(...continued)

CONTRA;
KANSAS;
Powell v. Powell. 231 Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218 (1982).

4

See, e.g.;

ILLINOIS;
In Re Marriage of White. 98 111. App. 3d 380, 53 111. Dec.
786, 424 N.E.2d 421 (111. App. Ct. 1981)
KENTUCKY;
Heller v. Heller. 672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984)
NEBRASKA;
Lockwood v. Lockwood. 205 Neb. 818, 290 N.W. 2d 636 (1980)
NEW JERSEY;
Dugan v. Dugan. 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1982)
Stern v. Stern. 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975)
L e w v. Lew. 264 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (N.J.
SUper. Ct. App. Div. 1978)
NORTH CAROLINA;
Dorton v. Dorton. 77 N.C. App. 667, 336 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1985)
Poore v. Poore. 75 N.C. App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266, disc. rev.
denied, 314 N.C. 543, 335 S.E.2d 316 (1985).
Weaver v. Weaver. 72 N.C. App. 409, 324 S.E.2d 915 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1985)
NORTH DAKOTA;
Nastrom v. Nastrom. 262 N.W.2d 487 (N.D. 1978)
See generally;
The Valuation of a Professional Practice in Equitable
Distribution. 22 Wake Forest L. Rev. 327 (1987)
Professional Corporation May Have Valuable Goodwill. Apart
from Person of Individual Member. That Must be
Considered in Property Settlement on Divorce. 11 St.
Mary's L. J. 222 (1979)
Comment. Professional Goodwill as Community Property;
Should Idaho Rule? 14 Idaho L. Rev. 473 (1978)

How

(continued...)
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There is no reason to treat the issue differently in
this instance.

Often the major asset of many marriages is the

professional practice managed by one spouse. The goodwill of that
practice can be valued by generally accepted accounting methods5
and its value can be allocated between the parties.

Dr. Sorensen

will continue to benefit from the goodwill established in his
dental practice.

Failure to value that goodwill and compensate

Mrs. Sorensen accordingly, would not comport with an equitable
distribution scheme.
B.

The Court of Appeals Considered All Appropriate
Evidence of Value.

Dr. Sorensen contends no evidence was offered at trial
to establish the value of the dental practice as of the date of
marriage and what evidence of value there was, indicated the
dental practice was a premarital asset of Dr. Sorensen1s.

The

4

(...continued)
CONTRA:

MISSOURI:
Carter v. Carter, 616 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
TEXAS:
Nail v. Nail. 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972). The decision was
discussed and criticized in The Exclusion of
Professional Good Will From Partition on Divorce. 10
Hous. L. Rev. 966 (1973).
WISCONSIN;
Holbrook v. Holbrook. 103 Wis. 2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343
(Wis. Ct. App. 1981)

See, e.g.. American Dental Association, Valuation of a
Dental Practice: A Brief Overview for Buyers and Sellers
(undated).
M
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issue is not properly before this Court.

It was never raised in

Dr. Sorensenfs initial brief, in his reply brief or at oral
argument.

It was not addressed by the Court of Appeals.

It

cannot be raised now for the first time.
C.

The District Court's Valuation of Dr. Sorensen's
Dental Practice Does not Constitute a Clear Abuse
of Its Discretion.

Dr. Sorensen also attacks the district court's
calculation of the overall value of his dental practice.

He

contends the court improperly included the accounts receivable,
but having done so, omitted any consideration of the accounts
payable.

In short, he asks the Court to substitute its judgment

for the district court's.
In determining whether the district court erred in
valuing the practice, the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to support the decision.
entitled to a presumption of validity.

The court's actions are
Hansen v. Hansen. 73 6

P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987); Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d
781, 782 (Utah 1986).

In particular,

[b]ecause parties often place widely disparate values
on assets to be distributed in a divorce proceeding,
determination of the assets' value is a matter for the
trial court, which will not be reversed in the absence
of a clear abuse of discretion.
Cook v. Cook. 739 P.2d 90, 93 (Utah App. 1987).
1.

Consideration of Accounts Receivable in the
Valuation of Goodwill Is not contrary to Utah
Law.

The district court included the value of accounts
receivable in the overall valuation of Dr. Sorensen's dental
practice.

He argued to the Court of Appeals that the accounts

receivable represented deferred income from which he could pay
his child support and short-term alimony obligation.

Since they

were income, he contended, it was error to include them as an
asset of the dental practice.

He relied exclusively on a

quotation from Dogu for support of his argument:

"The

corporation's accounts receivable represent deferred income from
which respondent may meet his ongoing alimony and child support
obligations to appellant."

Id. at 1309.

The Court of Appeals disagreed.

It was not persuaded

that the statement from Dogu stands for the proposition that
accounts receivable may never be considered in the valuation of a
professional corporation.

Even a cursory glance at Dogu reveals

it says nothing of the kind.
consideration of receivables.

The Supreme Court did not preclude
Rather, the Court was only

summarizing the district court's plan for distribution of the
value of the husband's professional corporation to demonstrate
that the district court had not abused its discretion.

The Court

of Appeals also observed that Dr. Sorensen had not cited any
other authority for his argument and then it noted that other
jurisdictions regularly include accounts receivable in the
property distribution and find error when it is not.
2.

The Division of Marital Assets Was Ecruitable
and Need Not Be Precisely Equal.

Dr. Sorensen contends Dr. Austin's valuation of the
dental practice failed to consider $10,129 in accounts payable.
The Court of Appeals held the record was unclear on the issue,
but that even if the full amount of the accounts payable had not
been considered, it was harmless error because the distribution
?i

of marital assets need not be precisely equal, only equitable*
Dr. Sorensen contends the ruling of the Court of Appeals was
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of its authority.

His

argument is not correct.
The district court attempted to divide the marital
property evenly, giving each spouse approximately $131,000 in
assets.
—

If it is true the accounts payable were not considered

in effect, awarding slightly less to Dr. Sorensen —

the

distribution is not error.
The Court of Appeals correctly noted that a division of
marital assets need not be mathematically precise and equal.
Corning v. Corning, 744 P.2d 325, 329 (Utah App. 1987) ("While
equality is a worthy goal, precise mathematical eq[uality is not
essential or required," citing Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695
(Utah 1985) and Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982)).
Rather, the task of the district court is to provide an equitable
adjustment of the parties1 financial resources:
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a
division of properties, [sic] it is a prerogative of
the court to make whatever disposition of property as
it deems fair, equitable and necessary for the
protection and welfare of the parties. In the division
of marital property, the trial judge has wide
discretion, and his findings will not be disturbed
unless the record indicates an abuse thereof.
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980).

True to

these guidelines, and in consideration of the total property
distribution between the parties, the Court of Appeals held the
district court had accomplished an equitable distribution which
would not be disturbed on appeal.

To do otherwise, as Dr.

Sorensen suggests, would obligate Utah appellate courts to render
oo

an accounting for every property distribution, approving only
those whose awards balance precisely and setting aside all
others.
One final note.

Dr. Sorensen rests his contention on

the absence of any reference to "accounts payable" in the
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or in the decree.
Remember, the district court accepted Dr. Austin's valuation of
the dental practice.

He testified that one of three components

making up his valuation was a sum for "intangible assets."

(Tr.

Vol. I at 70-72). To calculate that sum, Dr. Austin combined the
receipts and expenses of Dr. Sorensenfs practice to produce an
average of the profits earned by Dr. Sorensen over a three year
period.

(Tr. Vol. I at 70).

Dr. Austin testified that he

reviewed the accounts payable as part of his review of expenses.
(Tr. Vol. I at 71).

Thus, the figures which Dr. Sorensen

contends were ignored, actually are included in the valuation of
his practice.
Dr. Sorensen has shown the district court valued the
practice differently than he would and perhaps even contrary to
the testimony of his expert witness.

That does not constitute an

abuse of discretion.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF EXPENSES FOR EXPERT WITNESSES
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CLEAR ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION.
Dr. Sorensen's final argument challenges the award of

expert witness fees.

The district court ordered the parties to

bear the expense of their own expert witnesses, except the
expense of Allan Heiskanen, a real estate appraiser, which the
parties were to divide evenly.

(R. 96; Decree f 23).
0~k

Dr.

Sorensen contends (his brief at 39-41) expert witness fees may
not be taxed as costs beyond the $14 per diem rate* permitted by
Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4 (1953) .6 He asks the Court to vacate
that portion of the decree requiring him to pay one-half of Mr.
Heiskanen's fee.

The argument is not persuasive, because it is

not factually accurate.
On August 13, 1986, a pretrial conference was conducted
by the Domestic Relations Commissioner, B. Maurice Richards.
55).

(R.

The parties agreed at the conference to have their real

property appraised by an appraiser who was acceptable to them
both.

The expense of the appraiser was borne initially by Dr.

Sorensen; the decision of ultimate responsibility for payment was
left to the district court for subsequent determination.

The

parties1 agreement is memorialized in handwritten notes appearing
on the bottom of the Pretrial Conference Work Sheet.

(R. 54).

They read:
Parties are having the real property appraisal by
an agreed appraiser — Def. to pay costs initially and
court decides who finally pays.
The parties later selected Mr. Heiskanen as their appraiser.
Their understanding, specifically including the selection of Mr.

Section 21-5-4 provides:
Every witness legally required or in good faith
requested to attend upon a city or district court or a
grand jury is entitled to $14 per day for each day in
attendance and 30 cents for each mile actually and
necessarily traveled in going only; provided, that in
case of a witness's attending from without the state in
a civil case, mileage for such witness shall be allowed
and taxed for the distance actually and necessarily
traveled within the state in going only.
OA

Heiskanen, was made a part of the pre-trial order on September 4,
1986:
An appraisal of the family home occupied by
plaintiff, the dental office occupied by defendant, and
the farm in Liberty, Utah, will be made by Alan
Heiskanen with the cost of said appraisals to be paid
by defendant and the ultimate responsibility for the
cost of said appraisals to be determined by the Court.
(R. 57-58).

Dr. Sorensen's trial attorney, Mr. Echard, approved

the form of the order.

(R. 59). He did not file an objection to

it; neither did he request further hearing on it.

Dr. Sorensen

is deemed to have consented to the order.
Mr. Heiskanen appraised the properties and testified at
trial about their value.

(Tr. Vol. I at 6-36).

The district

court then divided evenly between the parties the responsibility
for payment of his expenses.

That is precisely what the parties

and the pretrial proceedings contemplated.
Dr. Sorensen supports his argument with a single case,
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980).
the district court's decision.

It is not inapposite to

In Kerr, the parties did not

agree to an allocation between them of expert witness fees and in
the absence of a stipulation, the district court unilaterally
allocated the fees as it chose.

The Sorensen's pretrial

stipulation factually distinguishes this case from Kerr.
The Court of Appeals concluded (opinion at 832-833) the
Sorensens had agreed in their pretrial stipulation that the
ultimate responsibility for payment of Mr. Heiskanen1s fee would
be determined by the district court.

The stipulation was binding

on Dr. Sorensen, unless he could demonstrate good cause to
warrant relief.

Dr. Sorensen simply did not agree with Mr.
25

Heiskanen's valuation of the parties' property, and that
difference of opinion, said the Court of Appeals, is not
sufficient good cause.
There is an additional consideration.

Nothing

indicates the witness fee was awarded as a "cost.1" Rather, the
fee was a "litigation expense," much like attorney's fees.

Such

expenses ordinarily are not recoverable by the party prevailing
in litigation.

Divorce proceedings are different, however.

Section 30-3-3 allows the district court discretion to award a
party such sums as will permit that party to bring or defend a
divorce action.

Historically, the statute has permitted an award

of attorney's fees, so long as the requesting party showed need
and the reasonableness of the fee. An expert witness, under
appropriate circumstances, is as necessary to the successful
prosecution or defense of an action as an attorney.

The district

court had discretion to award Mrs. Sorensen a portion of her
expert witness fees.
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-PETITION
Summary of Argument
Mrs. Sorensen testified of her financial need for an
award of attorney's fees and her attorney proferred evidence
about the fees.

Dr. Sorensen's attorney accepted the proffer and

stipulated that if Mrs. Sorensen's attorney were called as a
witness, he would testify the fees were reasonable and should be
awarded.

No contrary evidence was offered.

There was sufficient

evidence on which to base the award of attorney's fees.

Mrs. Sorensen successfully defended the appeal before
the Court of Appeals.

It was an abuse of the Court's discretion

not to award her attorney's fees on appeal.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO MRS.
SORENSEN WAS SUPPORTED BOTH BY EVIDENCE AND BY A STIPULATION
AT TRIAL BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
The district court awarded Mrs. Sorensen $2,000 for

attorney's fees.

The Court of Appeals correctly noted that in

order to recover attorney's fees in a divorce action, " . . . the
moving party must set forth evidence, 1) demonstrating that the
award is reasonable, and 2) establishing the financial need of
the requesting party compels the award."
supra at 832.

(Footnote omitted.)

Sorensen v. Sorensen,

The Court of Appeals

determined Mrs. Sorensen had adequately demonstrated sufficient
need.7

The Court said it could not find sufficient evidence in

the record about the "reasonableness" of the fee award, however.
It believed appellate counsel for Mrs. Sorensen had conceded no
evidence had been offered about the "reasonableness" of the fees;
Dr. Sorensen's trial counsel had stipulated to the truthfulness
of billing statements proferred by Mrs. Sorensen's trial counsel,
but that he had not stipulated to the fees' reasonableness; and,
neither the decree of divorce nor the written findings of fact
and conclusions of law make reference to the reasonableness of
the fees.

On that basis, the Court concluded the evidence was

Mrs. Sorensen testified she had incurred substantial
attorney's fees for the maintenance of the action. (Tr. Vol. I
at 145). She also testified she had no income other than the
temporary support she was then receiving from her husband. (Tr.
Vol. I at 148).

insufficient to sustain the award of attorney's fees, and it
reversed that portion of the decree of divorce.
The Court of Appeals' decision is not correct.

The fee

award was reasonable and the record reflects it.
First, Mrs. Sorensen's appellate counsel has never
conceded that evidence was not offered at trial regarding the
reasonableness of the attorney's fees incurred.

The Court of

Appeals was mistaken.
Second, the reasonableness of the attorney's fees was
sufficiently established at trial.

On the first morning of

trial, Mrs. Sorensen was examined by her trial counsel, Tim
Healy, about the attorney's fees she had incurred:
Q. Is it also correct, Mrs. Sorensen, in this
particular matter, that you have incurreid substantial
attorney fees in connection with the preparation and
trial of this case?
A.

Yes, I have.

Q. And is it correct, Mrs. Sorensen, that those
attorney fees are in the neighborhood of $3,700.00?
MR. ECHARD: Well, I'm going to object, Your
Honor. I think the time—do you intend to present
testimony later on?
MR. Healy: I could do that if you would like.
have a copy of the [billing] statement or whatever.

We

MR. ECHARD: If we could review that statement
over lunchtime, they shouldn't question what it is
approximately, I think I could accept Counsel's
statements.
THE COURT: Well, you talk about it over lunchtime
and see if you could proffer that.
MR. Healy:
(Tr. Vol. I at 145-146).

That's fine.
Later that day, Mrs. Sorensen's

attorney proffered the amount of his fees as itemized on his

billing statement (Tr. Ex. V) and he was prepared to testify
about the underlying justification for them:
MR. Healy: Your Honor, we have also agreed that I
would proffer to the Court at this time the attorney
fees and state what this is based on.
(Tr. Vol. I at 214).

(Emphasis added.)

The district court then

asked Mr. Echard to stipulate to Mr. Healy's proffer.

The court

did not ask him to stipulate the fees were reasonable or that
they should be awarded to Mrs. Sorensen.

Rather, the court only

asked Mr. Echard to stipulate that if Mr. Healy were called as a
witness, Mr. Healy would testify his fees were reasonable and
they should be awarded to Mrs. Sorensen.

The precise exchange

between the district court and Mr. Echard reads:
THE COURT: Would you stipulate, Mr. Echard, that
if Mr. Healy were to testify, that he would testify
that his fee in this matter is $3,587.50, in addition
therewith some witness subpoena fees. The stipulation
would not go to the question of whether or not they are
reasonable or whether they should be awarded, but that
would be his testimony. May it be so stipulated?
MR. ECHARD:

It may, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The Court would receive the
stipulation for that purpose. Maybe we ought to have
this [billing statement] marked, Mr. Healy, marked as
V.
(Tr. Vol. I at 214-215).

(Emphasis Added.)

At the close of

trial, Mr. Healy proffered evidence of additional fees incurred
in the trial.

Mr. Echard stipulated to the proffer with the same

conditions accepted earlier:
MR ECHARD: I agreed, Your Honor, that Counsel
could make a proffer as to attorney fees. I would not
agree to it, but I would accept it as to what he would
testify to with that.
MR. Healy: These are additional fees in
connection with the further Hearing.
99

THE COURT: That [a second billing statement] is
Exhibit X# and the Court will accept that as a proffer
of additional fees in this matter.
(Tr. Vol. II at 171).

(Emphasis added.)

Mr. Healy offered two billing statements as exhibits
(Tr. Exs. V and X).

They describe the work he performed, the

hours expended, and the hourly rates charged.

He was prepared to

testify about them, but Mr. Echard stipulated to the substance of
his anticipated testimony, including the reasonableness of the
fees.
Assuming, solely for the sake of discussion, the
stipulations made at trial were not sufficient, the district
court still possessed reliable information to assess the
reasonableness of the attorney's fees.

Remember, Mr. Healy's two

billing statements (Tr. Exs. V and X) describe the work he
performed, the total hours expended, and the hourly rates
charged.

His fees totaled $4,452.50 for 55.7 hours of service.

His fees were not unreasonable in view of the pleadings prepared,
negotiation of pretrial matters (temporary alimony and child
support, child custody and a restraining order, for example),
preparation of multiple trial witnesses, two days of trial, and
the complexity of the issues (accounting, in particular) —

all

of which are readily apparent in the record and were obvious to
the district court.

The district court had sufficient

information to assess the reasonableness of Mr. Healy's
attorney's fees.
In a dissenting opinion in Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745
P.2d 1276, 1281 (Utah 1987), Justice Durham encouraged the Court

to take judicial notice of the reasonableness of a fee award when
counsel's efforts were readily apparent in the record and were
known, therefore, to the district judge who made the award.

The

Court of Appeals did the same in Maucrhan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d
156, 162 (Utah App. 1989), a case strikingly similar to this one.
The Court canvassed the record and noted the efforts of counsel.
It concluded the district court had sufficient information to
assess the fee award and deferred to the district court's
assessment of reasonableness.
II.

MRS. SORENSEN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR
DEFENDING THE APPEAL IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS.
The district court entered a decree of divorce,

dissolving the marriage between the parties and dividing their
marital assets.

Dr. Sorensen was unwilling to abide by the

court's judgment and he filed an appeal. Mrs. Sorensen filed a
brief with the Court of Appeals and, among other issues, asked
for an award of the attorney's fees she would incur in the
appeal.

Brief of Respondent (before Court of Appeals) at 24.

Mrs. Sorensen's lawyer repeated the request for fees at the close
of his oral argument before the Court.
On February 10, 1989, the Court rendered its opinion.
The opinion did not address Mrs. Sorensen's request for
attorney's fees.

Accordingly, she filed a petition for rehearing

on February 24, 1989, raising only the issue of attorney's fees.
In an order dated March 2, 1989, the Court granted the petition
and remanded the case to the district court for a determination
of attorney's fees.

On March 6, 1989, Dr. Sorensen filed a

motion to set aside the Court's order.
31

His motion was granted

without comment, and Mrs. Sorensen's petition for rehearing was
denied on March 23, 1989.
Attorney's fees on appeal may be granted to either
party in a divorce action at the discretion of the court.

Carter

v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1953).

When the record evidences a party's financial need and

the party's arguments on appeal are affirmed, an award of
attorney's fees is justified.

Mauahan v. Maucrhan, 770 P.2d 156,

162 (Utah App. 1989).
It was an abuse of discretion to deny fees to Mrs.
Sorensen under these circumstances.
in need of financial assistance.

The record reflects she is

Moreover, the decree of divorce

was upheld by the Court of Appeals on every issue except one:
That part of the decree which ordered Dr. Sorensen to pay $2,000
towards Mrs. Sorensen's trial fees.
modification of the decree.

That is not a substantial

Workman v. Workman, 652 P,2d 931

(Utah 1982) (attorney's fees will not be awarded if a decree of
divorce is modified substantially on appeal).
clearly is the prevailing party.

Mrs. Sorensen

Mountain States Broadcasting

Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1989) (". . . the
party in whose favor the 'net' judgment is entered must be
considered the 'prevailing party' and is entitled to an award of
its fees.")
REQUEST FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
Elaine S. Sorensen hereby requests an award of the
attorney's fees incurred in the proceedings before the Utah
Supreme Court.

CONCLUSION
Mrs. Sorensen asks the Court (i) to affirm the decision
of the district court; (ii) to award her the costs she has
incurred on appeal; and (iii) to award her attorney's fees for
defending this appeal and the appeal before the Utah Court of
Appeals.
DATED:

February 5, 1990.
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.

Reid E. Lewis
Attorneys for Elaine S. Sorensen
Plaintiff, Respondent and
Cross-Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of February, 1990,
I mailed four copies of the Brief of Respondent and CrossPetitioner to:
Kent M, Kasting
John D. Sheaffer
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
310 South Main Street
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Elaine S. SORENSEN, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Clifford G. SORENSEN, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 870102-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 10, 1989.
Rehearing Denied March 23, 1989.
Husband appealed from divorce judgment of the Second District Court, Davis
County, Rodney S. Page, J., distributing
marital property. The Court of Appeals,
Billings, J., held that* (1) goodwill of husband's solo dental practice was marital asset properly subject to equitable distribution, and (2) trial court improperly awarded
wife attorney fees since there was no proof
of reasonableness of fees incurred.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Jackson, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and filed an opinion.
1. Divorce <s=»286<5)
In divorce proceeding, determining and
assigning values to marital property is matter for trial court and appellate court will
disturb those determinations absent showing of clear abuse of discretion.
2. Trial <s=»139.1(3), 140(1)
Assessing weight and credibility of expert witness testimony is matter for trier
of fact
3. Divorce «=»252.3(1)
Goodwill of husband's solo dental practice was marital asset subject to valuation
and equitable distribution in divorce action.
4. Divorce <s=>253(3)
Evaluation of goodwill attributable to
one party's business for purposes of making equitable distribution is question of
fact and is dependent on particular circumstances of case; in order to establish goodwill of divorcing spouse's professional practice as marital asset, party must produce

sufficient expert testimony to show that
goodwill constitutes valued business asset,
independent of continued presence of professional spouse, and trial courts may consider any legitimate valuation method that
measures present value of goodwill by taking into account past results and not postmarital efforts of professional spouse.
5. Divorce «=»253(4)
In making equitable distribution of
goodwill in divorce proceeding, trial court
should make specific findings, first indicating whether goodwill exists under particular circumstances of case, and if so, its
value; finding should clearly state evidence
upon which valuations are based, and preferably, valuation method or methods on
which court relied.
6. Divorce «=»253(3)
One factor that clearly should not be
considered in valuation of goodwill of professional spouse's practice for purposes of
equitable distribution is professional
spouse's future-earning capacity.
7. Appeal and Error «=>1008.1(4)
Trial court's fundamental role in adversary process is to judge credibility of witnesses, and he or she is free to choose
among expert testimony; appellate court
will give weight to fact that trial court
observed witnesses and their manner of
testifying and accepted one version of facts
rather than opposite.
8. Evidence «=>572
Valuation of $62,000 placed on goodwill of husband's dental practice for purposes of equitable distribution was sufficiently supported by testimony of wife's
expert, who was employed by brokerage
firm that had been in business over 18
years and sold more than 250 dental practices and who had personally been involved
in 12 appraisals and six sales of practices;
expert derived goodwill figure by considering factors such as history of earnings,
length of time husband had been in practice, number of patients, location of practice, facilities and equipment, accounts receivable, and transferability of profits to
DrosDective buver. goodwill valno ov.
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pressed as factor equaling 34% of gross
receipts was on low end of scale for dental
practices in state, and husband's expert
who attempted to rebut testimony was not
involved in sale and valuation of dental
practices.
9. Divorce <*=>253(3)
Trial court properly considered accounts receivable in valuing husband's dental practice for purposes of equitable distribution.
10. Divorce «=»286(9)
Even assuming that trial court failed
to consider full amount of accounts payable
in its valuation of husband's dental practice
for purposes of equitable distribution, such
mistake was harmless error considering
that both parties to action were awarded
approximately $131,000 in marital assets
and that property distributions in divorce
actions were not required to be equal, but
rather equitable.
11. Divorce *=>226
In order to recover attorney fees in
divorce action, moving party must set forth
evidence demonstrating that award is reasonable, and establishing financial need of
requesting party.
12. Divorce «=»226
Trial court improperly awarded wife
attorney fees in divorce action, as there
was no evidence offered regarding "reasonableness of fees" charged; wife's attorney
proffered exhibit reflecting only time spent
and rates charged, and there was no evidence relating to reasonableness of number
of hours, usual hourly rate for divorce
cases in community nor overall reasonableness of fee.
13. Divorce «=>227(1)
Trial court properly required husband
to pay portion of fee for expert appraiser
which was in excess of statutory rate, as
parties had agreed by pretrial stipulation to
have their real property appraised by expert and further agreed that his fee would
be paid initially by husband with ultimate
responsibility for payment to be determined by trial court U.C.A.1953, 21-5-

Kent Kasting, Salt Lake City, for appellant
Reid E. Lewis and Jeffrey Robinson, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and
JACKSON, JJ.
BILLINGS, Judge:
In this divorce action, defendant/appellant, Clifford G. Sorensen ("Dr. Sorensen")
appeals the trial court's property valuation
and distribution, award of attorney fees to
Mrs. Sorensen, and the allocation of expert
witness fees. We affirm the property distribution and allocation of expert witness
fees but reverse the award of attorney
tees.
FACTS
The parties were married on April 10,
1975. Mrs. Sorensen was a registered
nurse. Dr. Sorensen was a dentist and had
practiced in Roy, Utah for approximately
six years prior to the marriage. The parties have four children, ages 10, 9, 6, and 3
at the time of trial There is no dispute as
to custody, child support, or alimony.,
During the marriage, Dr. Sorensen continued to practice as a dentist in Roy. Mrs.
Sorensen returned to school and received
her masters degree in nursing and also
completed all the necessary courses for a
Ph.D. in public health.
At trial, Mrs. Sorensen claimed Dr. Sorensen's dental practice, a professional corporation, was a marital asset subject to
valuation and distribution by the court
Mrs. Sorensen called Dr. Richard Austin as
an expert witness* Dr. Austin had been a
dentist in Utah for four and one-half years.
Dr. Austin also worked for a Denver company that brokered the purchase and sale
of dental practices. His brokerage company had appraised and sold approximately
250 dental practices. Dr. Austin had participated in 12 appraisals and 7 sales of
dentistry practices. Six of the 7 sales oc-
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Dr. Austin testified that the fair market
value of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice was
$100,060 and that dental practices in Utah
generally sold for 90 to 95 percent of their
appraised value. In connection with his
testimony, Dr. Austin presented the trial
court his written valuation of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice. Dr. Austin's valuation was based on unaudited information
previously provided by Dr. Sorensen
through discovery. Dr. Austin's calculation was the combined value of three components: 1) tangible assets, ic, furniture
and equipment—$15,330, 2) accounts receivable—$22,170,' and 3) intangible assets
or "goodwill"—$62,560, for a total market
value of $100,060. Dr. Austin further testified "[i]t is important to realize that this
evaluation has been made [according to]
the standards that are currently acceptable
for this purpose. Existing market trends
in the state of Utah for the disposition of
dental practices were given consideration."
To determine the goodwill value, Dr.
Austin reviewed the income and expenses
of Dr. Sorensen's practice for a three year
period, 1983 through 1985. During this
time, Dr. Sorensen averaged $184,000 in
gross receipts. Dr. Austin testified that
the "goodwill" value of dental practices he
had appraised in Utah ranged from 15 to 80
percent of their gross receipts depending
on a number of factors. These factors
include: the length the practice had been
operating, location, number of patients,
profitability, currency of accounts receivable, and an evaluation of the transferability
of profit to a prospective buyer. Applying
the foregoing factors to Dr. Sorensen's
practice, Dr. Austin concluded the goodwill
value was 34 percent of the gross receipts
for a total of $62,560. Specifically, Dr.
Austin testified:
The age of a dental practice plays an
important role in determining its value.
Dr. Sorensen has been practicing in the
community for a number of years and
has established a good reputation for
family dental care. The number of pa1. To arrive at a dollar value attributable to
accounts receivable. Dr. Austin excluded all accounts unpaid over 120 days, and discounted

tients of record and the maintenance of
healthy production figures attest to this.
Dr. Sorensen's practice location is on a
very highly traveled street and is in an
excellent location for visibility and pubbc
exposure. Parking is convenient The
office space is adequate and functional.
However, updating equipment and leasehold improvements would increase the
value of this practice.
The aging of the accounts receivable indicates that the practice has a healthy collection policy and that the receptionist is
doing a good job of collecting.
The community of Roy has a healthy,
growing economy. The influx of new
dentists into the area quickly absorbs
patients seeking new dentists.
In response to Dr. Austin's testimony,
Dr. Sorensen called two expert witnesses:
Mr. Gerald Deters, his accountant, and Mr.
Roger Nuttal, a CPA. Mr. Deters compared the respective income, expenses, and
profit of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice for
the years 1974 and 1986, and concluded
that since the date of the marriage, Dr.
Sorensen's practice was "a little bit bigger,
a little better." Mr. Deters further testified that goodwill had never been shown as
an asset of Dr. Sorensen's professional corporation.
Dr. Sorensen also called Mr. Roger Nuttal, who evaluated the Sorensen's entire
financial situation, both business and personal. Mr. Nuttal testified that he believed
some goodwill existed, but found Dr. Austin's calculations "very questionable." He
further testified that Dr. Austin failed to
consider $10,129 in accounts payable.
Thereafter, relying primarily on Dr. Austin's calculations less the amount for accounts payable, Mr. Nuttal testified that
Dr. Sorensen's dental practice was worth
approximately $87,096.
With reference to the dental practice, the
trial court concluded with our emphasis:
[Defendant has continued to practice
dentistry in Roy, Utah, during the course
of the marriage and has an office with an
the resulting amount by 12 percent to account
for uncoUectibles.
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excellent location; has continued to build
his clientele; has a good fee collection
record and a good reputation in the community.
The Court finds the total value of the
practice to be $100,000 including accounts receivable and all equipment with
the exception of the computer.
That dental practices usually sell for approximately 90 percent of the appraised
value
The defendant should be awarded the
dental practice including all equipment
and accounts receivable the Court feeling that the large portion of the value
of the practice has to do with good will
and reputation built up in the practice
over the years of marriage. The only
reasonable way to value said practice is
to proportion it based upon the years the
parties have been married during the
practice. Based on their eleven years of
marriage over sixteen years of practice
for the purpose of distribution, the Court
values the practice at 69 percent of the
value as found above for a total of $62,100.
The trial court then ordered essentially
an equal division of the parties' property
crediting $62,100 to Dr. Sorensen for his
practice and an equal amount of offsetting
property to Mrs. Sorensen.
The trial court also ordered Dr. Sorensen
to contribute $2,000 toward Mrs. Sorensen's attorney fees. Mrs. Sorensen testified she had incurred fees, but she had no
present income to pay those fees. Mrs.
Sorensen's attorney proffered an exhibit
reflecting the time spent and the rates
charged. Dr. Sorensen's counsel stipulated
that the proffer could be received but expressly refused to stipulate that the fees
were reasonable.
The trial court also ordered the parties to
bear the expense of their own expert witnesses, with the exception of Allan Heiskanen, a real estate appraiser, whose fees the
parties were ordered to split The Sorensens, by pretrial stipulation, agreed to have
their real property appraised by Mr. Heis-

expense of the appraiser was to be paid
initially by Dr. Sorensen with the ultimate
responsibility for payment to be determined by the trial court
Dr. Sorensen raises three issues on appeal. First, he claims the trial court erred
in its valuation of his dental practice by, 1)
determining that "goodwill" was a marital
asset subject to equitable distribution, 2)
including Dr. Sorensen's accounts receivable in the valuation of the dental practice,
and 3) failing to consider accounts payable
in its evaluation of the practice. Second,
Dr. Sorensen claims the trial court erred in
awarding Mrs. Sorensen a portion of her
attorney fees.
Finally, Dr. Sorensen
claims the trial court erred by ordering him
to pay a portion of Mr. Heiskanen's expert
witness fee.

I. VALUATION OF DENTAL
PRACTICE
[1,2] In a divorce proceeding:, "determining and assigning values to marital
property is a matter for the trial court and
this Court will not disturb those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of
discretion." Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83,
84 (Utah CtApp.1987). "In making such
orders, the trial court is permitted broad
latitude, and its judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so long as. it exorcises its
discretion in accordance with the standards
set by this Court" Newmeyer v. Newmeyert 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 ([Utah 1987) (citations omitted). An appealing party bears
the burden of establishing that the trial
court violated those standards "or that the
trial court's factual findings upon which
the [property] division is grounded are
clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a)." I± Furthermore, assessing the weight and credibility of expert
witness testimony is a matter for the trier
of fact See Yelderman v. Yelderman,
669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) ("it is within
the province of the fact finder to believe
those witnesses or evidence it chooses").
Goodwill
[3] In its property distribution, the trial
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which represents the trial court's assessment of the total value of Dr. Sorensen's
dental practice. As part of its calculations,
the trial court assigned a substantial value
to the goodwill of Dr. Sorensen's professional dental corporation. On appeal, we
must first determine whether goodwill is
properly considered a marital asset subject
to distribution, and if so, whether there is
competent evidence to support the trial
court's finding as to the goodwill value of
Dr. Sorensen's professional corporation.
In a divorce action, trial courts should
distribute marital property and income in
order that 'the parties may readjust their
lives to their new circumstances as well as
possible." Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d
1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted).
"[M]arital property 'encompasses all of the
assets of every nature possessed by the
parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived
'" Id. at 1079 (citation omitted). The Utah Supreme Court
has emphasized:
[WJhether a resource is subject to distribution does not turn on whether the
spouse can presently use or control it, or
on whether the resource can be given a
present dollar value. The essential criterion is whether a right to the benefit
or asset has accrued in whole or in part
during the marriage.
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431,
432-33 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added).
The question of whether the goodwill of
a professional corporation is a marital asset, properly subject to equitable distribution in a divorce action, is one of first
impression for this Court,2 although the
Utah Supreme Court recently addressed

the issue indirectly in Gardner v. Gardner,
748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). In Gardner,
the trial court awarded Dr. Gardner his
retirement account and medical assets
without assigning them a present value.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's decision, and remanded for further
proceedings for a valuation of the medical
assets and retirement account In considering the valuation and distribution of the
doctor's medical assets, the Court stated
"[t]he ability of a business to generate
income from its continued patronage is
commonly referred to as good will. Good
will is properly subject to equitable distribution upon divorce." Id. at 1080 n. 1
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). The
dissent chastises us for our reliance on the
language in Gardner claiming Justice
Stewart intended to limit his endorsement
of goodwill as a marital asset to multimembered
professional
corporations.
However, Justice Stewart does not make a
distinction as to the "type" of business
entity and in fact, in Gardner, the Utah
Supreme Court relied on Dugan v. Dugan,
92 NJ. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983), and In re
Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash.2d 324, 588
P.2d 1136 (1979), to support its conclusion
that the goodwill of a professional corporation is subject to distribution in a divorce
proceeding. See Gardner, 748 P.2d at
1080 n. 1. Both decisions involved solely
owned or operated professional practices.

2. In Stevens v. Stevens, 754 ?2d 952 (Utah C L
App.1988), Judge Jackson, writing for this
Court, found that the appellant confused "goodwill" with "going concern value," and failed to
prove the existence of goodwill by competent
evidence. Id. at 956-57.

301 (1985) (professional corporation); In re
Marriage of Nichols, 43 CoIoj\pp. 383, 606 ?2d
1314 (1979) (professional association); Wright
v. Wright, 469 JL2d 803 (Del.Fam.CL 1983) (sole
practitioner); In re Marriage of White, 98 111.
AppJd 380. 53 IlLDec 786. 424 N.E^d 421
(1981) (professional corporation); Heller v. Heller, 672 S.WJd 945 (Ky.CLApp.1984) (professional corporation); Kowalesky v. Kowalesky,
148 MickApp. 151. 384 N.WJZd 112 (1986) (professional corporation); Roth v. Roth, 406 N.W.
2d 77 (Minn.Ctj\pp.l987) (sole practitioner);
Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1987)
(partnership); In re Marriage of Hull, 712 PJZd
1317 (Mont.1986) (professional corporation):

3. See, e.g, Rostel v. Rostel, 622 PJd 429 (Alaska
1981). rev'd on other grounds, 749 ?2d 343
(Alaska 1988) (close corporation—husband and
wife sole shareholders); Mitchell v. Mitchell 152
Ariz. 317. 732 ?2d 208 (1987) (partnership);
Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194. 741 S.W.2d 640
(1987) (professional corporation); In re Marriage of Watts, 171 CaLApp3d 366, 217 CaLRptr.

The prevailing view among 20 other jurisdictions is that the goodwill of a professional practice or business is a marital asset, subject to valuation, and therefore,
should be considered in a divorce proceeding.2 Jurisdictions holding to the contrary
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include Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Texas, and Tennessee.4
The most common legal definition describes "goodwill" as:
[TJhe advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the
mere value of the capital, stock, funds,
or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage
and encouragement which it receives
from constant or habitual customers, on
account of its local position, or common
celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or
even from ancient partialities or prejudices.5
Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721. 386 N.W.2d 851
(1986) (professional corporation); Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423. 457 A^d 1 (1983) (sole practitioner); Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 657 R2d
1169 (1983) (professional corporation); Dorton
v. Dorton, Tl N.CApp. 667. 336 S.E^d 415
(1985); Jondahl v. Jondahl, 344 N.W.2d 63 (N.D.
1984) (sole practitioner); In re Marriage of Retting, 66 Orj\pp. 284. 673 P.2d 1360 (1983) (sole
practitioner); Fait v. Fait, 345 N.W.2d 872 (SJX
1984) (professional association); In re Marriage
of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236. 692 P.2d 175 (1984)
(professional corporation).
4e See, eg., Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. 456. 648
P.2d 218 (1982); Pearce v. Pearce, 482 So.2d
108 (La.Ct.App. 1986) (expert testimony failed to
prove sole proprietorship had goodwill value);
Carter v. Carter, 616 S.W.2d 543 (Mo.Ct.App.
1981); Beasley v. Beasley, 359 Pa^uper. 20. 518
A^d 545 (1986); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis.
2d 327. 309 N.W.2d 343 (CLApp.1981); Nail v.
Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.1972) (no goodwill in
sole proprietorship). But see Geesbreght v.
Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.CivJVpp.1978)
(goodwill of professional corporation is marital
asset). See also. Smith v. Smith, 709 S.W.2d 588
(Tenn.CtApp.1985).
5. Comment. Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing
Professional Goodwill or Community Property at
Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 Tui L
Rev. 313, 314 (1981) (quoting J. Story. Commentaries on the Law of Partnerships § 99, at 170
(6th ed. 1868))« See also Hanson v. Hanson,
Mitchell v. Mitchell: The Division of Professional
Goodwill Upon Marital Dissolution, 11 Harv.
Women's LX 147, 149 (1988); and Jackson v.
Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81. 415 P.2d 667, 670
(1966).
6. Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423. 457 A.2d 1. 4
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In the accounting field, goodwill is referred to generally as " 'the summation of
all the special advantages, not otherwise
identifiable, related to a going concern. It
includes such items as a good name, capable staff and personnel, high credit standing, reputation for superior products and
services, and favorable location.'"*
'There can be no doubt that goodwill
exists. It is a legally protectable interest" 7 Goodwill has been held to constitute "property" within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment due process clause *
and is subject to being bought and sold.9
Goodwill may be present whether the business form is a sole proprietorship, partnership,1* association, joint venture, or corporation.11
Intermediate Accounting 283 (7th ed. standard
vol. 1982)).
7. Dugan, 457 A^d at 4.
8. McDermott v. City of Seattle, 4 RSupp. 855,
857 (D.Wash.1933) (and citations therein).
9. Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81. 415 P.2d
667. 670 (1966).
10. In Mitchell v. Mitchell the Arizona Supreme
Court noted that there is confusion in this area
of the law, partly because the analysis of whether goodwill should be considered an asset often
involves the dissolution of a partnership which
is sometimes controlled by a partnership agreement, as opposed to the dissolution of a marriage. 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987).
The Arizona Court described the dissolution of a
marriage as follows:
A professional practice goes automatically to
the spouse licensed to practice i t He is not
selling out or liquidating, but continuing in
business. Effectively, it is the case of the
silent partner withdrawing from a going business. And, if such partner is to receive fair
compensation for her share, or her enforced
retirement, it should be so evaluated.
Id
Such is the case in Jackson v. Caldwell, authority relied on by Dr. Sorensen for the proposition that goodwill should not be considered
marital property subject to distribution in divorce proceedings. See Jackson, 415 P.2d at
670-71.
11. See, eg., Dugan, 457 A^d at 4; Mitchell, 732
P.2d at 210-11; Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945.
947 (Ky.CtApp.1984); Hanson v. Hanson, 738
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The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions considering the issue find that goodwill is a property interest, and as such, it
must be considered in divorce proceedings.
Whether goodwill exists and has value in a
particular case, is a question of fact Accordingly, we agree with the majority of
jurisdictions and the dicta in Gardner v.
Gardner, and hold that the goodwill of a
professional practice is a marital asset subject to valuation and distribution in the
appropriate circumstances.
Judge Jackson, in his dissent, criticizes
the approach taken by the Washington and
California courts in valuing goodwill before
they address whether it exists at all.
Judge Jackson adamantly asserts that any
approach to valuing goodwill should involve a two-step inquiry: does goodwill exist in this particular entity, and if so, what
is its value. Although some courts do go
directly to the valuation issue, a conclusion
that a value exists implicitly answers the
first inquiry in the affirmative. More importantly, however, we think our opinion
clearly directs trial courts to engage in the
two-part approach.
We concede that there is a split of authority on this issue, but we find those
jurisdictions holding to the contrary unpersuasive. Courts that refuse to recognize
goodwill as a marital asset base their conclusions, generally, on three grounds.
First, opponents contend that goodwill is
not an asset separate and apart from the
individual practitioner and in this respect,
goodwill is analogous to a professional degree.12 Second, they claim that goodwill is
12. See Powell v. Powell 231 Kan.App.2d 456,
646 P\2d 218, 223 (1982); Hotbrook v. Hotbrook,
103 Wis^d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (CtJVpp.
1981); Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex.
1972).
13. See Powett, 648 P.2d at 223; Hotbrook. 309
N.WJd at 354; NaU, 486 S.W.2d at 764.
14. See, e,g., Hotbrook, 309 N.W\2d at 354.
15. See, &*, Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317,
732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987); In re Marriage of
Nichols, 43 CoIoApp. 383, 606 P.2d 1314. 1315
(1979); Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945. 948
(Ky.CLApp.1984); Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423,
457 A2d 1, 6 (1983).

indistinguishable from future earning capacity and is valuable to the individual only
to the extent that it assures substantial
earnings in the future.13 Finally, opponents assert that goodwill is difficult to
value, hence it should not be considered in
divorce settlements.14 We address each of
these arguments separately.
In Holbrook v. Holbrook, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court expressed the view that
goodwill does not "bestow on those who
have an ownership interest in the business,
an actual, separate property interest" 103
Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (CtApp.
1982). Accordingly, the Wisconsin Court
determined that goodwill is more analogous
to a professional degree than a property
interest. Id.
We disagree with Wisconsin's rationale.
There are significant and distinctive differences between the goodwill of a professional practice and a professional degree.15
Unlike a professional degree, goodwill is
traditionally defined as an intangible
"property right" l< It is a separate and
distinct asset, not merely a factor contributing to the earning capacity of the practitioner. See In re Marriage of Hall, 103
Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175,178 (1984). The
theory underlying goodwill is that an ongoing business has a value beyond mere
tangible assets. These intangible assets
are independent of the proprietor, and as
such, can be sold on an open market In re
Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo.App. 383, 606
?2A 1314, 1315 (19^9). In Nichols, the
Colorado Court of Appeals stated:
16. See, e.g.t In re Marriage of Nichols, 606 P2d
at 1315. In addition to those authorities holding that goodwill is a marital asset, see note 3,
supra, even those jurisdictions holding to the
contrary, nonetheless find that good will is a
property interest See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 231
Kan. 456. 648 ?2d 218. 222 (1982); Nail v. Nail,
486 &W.2d 761. 763 (Tex.1972); Beasley v. Beasley, 518 A2d 545. 552 (Pa^uper.1986); Pearce v.
Pearce 482 SoJ2d 108, 111 (La.CLApp.1986). Instead, these cases typically find that the particular facts did not demonstrate that the goodwill
had value, and therefore, goodwill per se should
not be considered a marital asset See Powell
648 P-2d at 222-24; Nail 486 S.W.2d at 764;
Beasley, 518 A^d at 552; Pearce, 482 So.2d at
111.
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While we recognize that professional
goodwill is not an asset which has an
independent market value, it can, in conjunction with the assets of the practice,
be sold. This limited marketability distinguishes professional goodwill from the
advanced educational degree, which, because it is personal to its holder and is
non-transferable, [is] held not to be property... .
Id.
When goodwill exists, it may well be
regarded as "the most lucrative asset of
some enterprises."17
It is the property attributes of goodwill
that distinguish it from a professional degree, which we have held on prior occasions
does not constitute marital property subject to distribution.18
Several courts have found that "[t]he
better analogy is to pension rights which
are marital property." Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987)
(and citations therein). Both are property
rights acquired during the marriage although their enjoyment and benefits are
deferred. Id Our Supreme Court has
stated that marital property encompasses
pension funds. Gardner v. Gardner, 748
P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988); Woodward v.
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1982).
In Woodward, the Court declared with
our emphasis:
[Appellant's] argument fails to recognize
that pension or retirement benefits are a

form of deferred compensation by the
employer. If the rights to those benefits
are acquired during the marriage, then
the court must at least consider those
benefits in making an equitable distribution of the marital assets. The right
(emphasis in the original) to receive monies in the future is unquestionably . . .
an economic resource, subject to equitable distribution based upon proper
computation of its present dollar value.' »•
Similarly, if goodwill can be shown by
competent credible evidence to exist at the
time of dissolution and that nt was acquired
or accrued during the marriage, trial courts
must "at least consider those benefits in
making an equitable distribution of the
marital assets." Id See also In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 CaLApp.3d 93, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 58, 68 (1974).
The second major criticism of treating
goodwill as a marital asset is that goodwill
is indistinguishably tied to personal future
earnings. Thus, if the practitioner (dies or
retires, "nothing remains."10
We believe to the contrary. We note at
the outset, that goodwill is and must be
distinguished from a professional practitioner's future earning capacity, an issue
more fully addressed below. A number of
jurisdictions have held that goodwill is not,
however, per se synonymous with future
earning capacity.21
In addition to those jurisdictions, one
commentator opined that "[tjhere is no val-

17. Dugan, 457 AJd at 5. See also In re Marriage 19. Woodward, 656 ?2d at 432 (quoting Kikkert
of Goger, 27 Or.App. 729. 557 ?2d 46, 47 (1976).
v. Kikkert, 177 NJ.Super. 471. 427 A2d 76. 78
(1981), quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 NJ. 464,
18. See Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah
CLApp.1987); Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 375 >L2d 659, 662 (1977)), aff'd, 88 NJ. 4, 438
A^d 317 (1981).
(Utah CLApp.1987). In Petersen, we held that
an educational degree is not encompassed within the broad views of the concept of "property." 2a Powell v. Powell 231 Kan. 456, 648 ?J2d 218,
223 (1982). See also, Hotbrook v. HoWrook, 103
It does not have an exchange value or any
Wis^d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (CtApp.1981)
objective transferable value on an open mar(goodwill is valuable only to the extent that it
ket. It is personal to the holder. It termiassures continued substantial future earnings).
nates on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged
It is simply an 21. See, e.g., Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423, 457
intellectual achievement that may potentially
hid 1. 6 (1983); bt re Marriage of Lopez 38
assist in the future acquisition of property.
Cal.App.3d 93, 113 CaLRptr. 58. 67 (1974); In re
In our view it has none of the attributes of
Marriage of Hall 103 Washed 236, 692 P.2d
property in the usual sense of that term.'
175, 178 (1984).
737 P.2d at 240 (quoting In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75. 77 (1978)).
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id basis for the argument that since goodwill is essentially a measure of future earnings, it cannot properly be treated as a
marital asset
" 2 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property, § 23.05[2]
at 23-69 (1988). The commentator further
declared that "[i]t is an economic truism
that the value of any income-producing asset is its capacity to produce future income.
In this regard, goodwill is just like any
other asset Goodwill differs only insofar
as, unlike a stock or bond, it will not produce income by itself." Id
The argument that goodwill disappears
in a case where the practitioner dies or
retires is also unpersuasive. The possibility of continued patronage, despite the absence of the selling practitioner, has
present value to a prospective buyer of a
professional practice. See In re Marriage
of Nichols, 43 ColoJVpp. 383, 606 P.2d
1314, 1315 (1979). Moreover, the value of
goodwill frequently remains notwithstanding the practitioner's death, resignation, or
disability. See In re Marriage of White,
98 Ill.App.3d 380, 53 IlLDec 786, 789, 424
N.E.2d 421, 424 (1981). "If it were otherwise, we are unable to conceive the basis
for the popular practice of retaining the
names of deceased or withdrawn members
in many professional firms long after their
death or withdrawal." Id The possibility
of death or retirement of the practitioner
may reduce the value of goodwill, but it
does not in all circumstances eliminate its
existence. In re Marriage of Hall, 103
Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 178 (1984).
When a professional retires or dies, his
earning capacity also either retires or
dies. Nevertheless, the goodwill that
once attached to his practice may continue in existence in the form of established
patients or clients, referrals, trade name,
location and associations which now attach to former partners or buyers of the
practice
[A] professional can transport all of his skill (earning rapacity) to a
new town, but patients or clients, reputation and referrals (goodwill) cannot always be transported.
Id. If the facts in a particular case demonstrate that there is no goodwill value remaining in the absence of the practitioner

then a trial court may properly declare in
its determination of a practice's worth, that
there is no value attributable to goodwill.
The third and most unpersuasive argument is that goodwill is difficult to value,
therefore, it should not be considered in the
distribution of marital assets. See, e.g.,
Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d 327, 309
N.W.2d 343, 354 (CtApp.1981). This also
seems to be the position taken by the dissent
We concede that in some cases, valuing
goodwill is difficult Even so, if a party's
expert witness cannot adequately demonstrate that goodwill has a present value,
then there is simply an evidentiary defect
and goodwill should not be considered.
However, the mere fact that goodwill may
be difficult to value or elusive in nature,
does not justify ignoring or disregarding it
altogether in the valuation of marital property. In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo.
App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314, 1316 (1980);
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732
P.2d 208, 211 (1987). As in Mitchell, "[w]e
prefer to accept the economic reality that
the goodwill of a professional practice has
value, and it should be treated as property
upon dissolution of the community, regardless of the form of business/' Mitchell,
732 P.2d at 212. We are mindful that not
every professional practice necessarily has
goodwill. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Hall, 692 P.2d at 179. Some courts, however, hold that sole proprietorships per se
do not have goodwill because the business's existence depends exclusively on the
professional spouse's continuing efforts.
See, e.g.t Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761
(Tex. 1972). We are not prepared to rule so
broadly. Instead, we emphasize that the
issue is one of proof, and not the particular
form the business takes. "It would be
inequitable to hold that the form of the
business enterprise can defeat the community's interest in the professional goodwill.
Such a result ignores the contribution made
by the non-professional spouse to the success of the professional
" Mitchell,
739 V9A of o n
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Valuation of Goodwill
Because we find that the goodwill of Dr.
Sorensen's dental practice was properly
considered by the trial court in its property
distribution, we next address Dr. Sorensen's contention that the trial court erred in
the value it ultimately placed on the goodwill of his dental practice.
[4] "It is a difficult task at best to
arrive at a value for the intangible component of a professional practice attributable
to goodwill." Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152
Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 214 (1987). The
valuation of goodwill is a question of fact
and is dependent upon the particular circumstances.22 In order to establish that
the goodwill of a divorcing spouse's professional practice is a marital asset, a party
must produce sufficient expert testimony
to show that the goodwill constitutes a
valued business asset, independent of the
continued presence of the professional
spouse.23 Trial courts may consider any
legitimate valuation method "that measures the present value of goodwill by taking into account past results, and not postmarital efforts of the professional
spouse
" Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C.App.
414, 331 S.E.2d 266, 271 (1985).
Factors courts have frequently found to
affect the value of goodwill include:
[T]he age, health, and professional reputation of the practitioner, the nature of
the practice, the length of time the practice has been in existence, its past profits, its comparative professional success,
and the value of its other assets.24
Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals
observed that the value of goodwill may be
shown in a number of ways. " 'Elements
which may be considered are, length oi
time the business has been in existence;
22. Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d
640, 647 (1987); Carriker v. Carriker, 151 Ariz.
296, 727 ?J2d 349f 350 (Ct.App.1986). Accord
Poore v. Poore, 75 N.CApp. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266
(1985); In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or.App. 729,
557 P.2d 46 (1976); Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M.
641. 615 P.2d 256 (1980).
23. See Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721. 386
N.W.2d 851, 858 (1986); Hanson v. Hanson, 738
S.W.2d 429. 434 (Mo.1987).

the nature and character of the business;
its success or lack thereof; its average
profits; and the probability of its continuance under the same name.' " In re Marriage of Goger, 2TJ Or.App. 729, 557 P.2d
46, 47 (1976) (quoting Levene v. City of
Salem, 191 Or. 182, 229 P.2d 255, 263
(1951)). " 'Past profits may be established,
and the value of the goodwill estimated
therefrom as a basis, subject to being reduced by a showing of a depression in
trade or other circumstances that would
tend to make the business less valuable.... ' " Id.
[51 Trial courts should make specific
findings, first indicating whether goodwill
exists under the particular circumstances
of the case, and if so, its value. Findings
should clearly state the evidence upon
which the valuations are based, and preferably, the valuation method or methods on
which the court relied. See Poore v.
Poore, 75 N.C.App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266,
272 (1985).
[61 We emphasize, however, one factor
that clearly should not be considered in the
valuation of goodwill is the professional
spouse's future earning capacity. Consistent with our position that professional degrees are not assets capable of distribution,
we similarly hold that the future earning
capacity of the divorcing professional
should not be considered. To consider future earning capacity in the valuation of
the professional corporation's goodwill
would have the effect of double counting,
as earning capacity is also utilized in determining an appropriate alimony award.
See, e.g., Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566
(Utah 1985).
[7,8] In this action, Mrs. Sorensen
called Dr. Austin, an expert witness emi24. Poore, 331 S.E.2d at 271 (citing Hurley v.
Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980)); Accord In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or App. 729,
557 P.2d 46 (1976). See abo In re Marriage of
Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 179 (1984);
Hertz v. Hertz. 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169. 1174
(1983).
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nently qualified to appraise dental practices. Dr. Austin had practiced dentistry in
Utah for approximately four and one-half
years and worked for a firm which is in the
business of appraising and selling dental
practices. Dr. Austin's brokerage firm has
been in business over eighteen years and
sold more than 250 dental practices. Dr.
Austin has personally been involved in 12
appraisals and sold 6 practices in Utah.
Based on financial information supplied
by Dr. Sorensen, Dr. Austin determined
that the goodwill value of the corporation
was $62,560. The procedure employed by
Dr. Austin is one commonly used by his
brokerage firm, and is also consistent with
the methodologies recognized and approved
in other jurisdictions previously discussed
herein.25 The goodwill figure was derived
by considering factors such as a history of
the corporation's earnings, the length of
time Dr. Sorensen had been in practice, the
number of his patients, the location of the
practice, his facilities and equipment, accounts receivable, and an evaluation of the
transferability of profits to a prospective
buyer.

sional corporation's goodwill. The trial
court apparently chose to believe Dr. Austin, and we will not disturb the trial court's
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). A trial
court's fundamental role in the adversary
process is to judge the credibility of witnesses and he or she is free to choose
among expert testimony. See Canning v.
Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 329 (Utah CtApp.
1987). See also Lochwood v. Lockwooa\
205 Neb. 818, 290 N.W.2d 636, 640 (1980).
"[T]his court will give weight to the fact
that the trial court observed the witnesses
and their manner of testifying and accepted one version of facts rather than the
opposite." Id.

To refute Dr. Austin's valuation, Dr. Sorensen called Mr. Deters, his accountant,
and Mr. Nuttal, a CPA. Neither witness
demonstrated expertise in appraising dental practices, and their testimony was virtually nonresponsive on the issue of a profes-

Other jurisdictions have upheld a trial
court choosing the testimony of one party's
expert over the other's expert in the context of valuing goodwill. See, e.g., Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich.App. 151,
384 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1986); In re Marriage of Hull, 712 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Mont
1986); Wright v. Wright, 469 A.2d 803, 808
(Del.Fam.Ctl983). In Wright, the Delaware Court indicated that one of the important considerations for its decision to accept one expert's testimony was that the
husband's expert had never been involved
in the sale or liquidation of like practices.
469 A.2d at 808 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Kowalesky, a case involving the valuation of a dental practice, the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that the trial court's
valuation, which seemed to favor the plaintiff, was not clearly erroneous. The trial
court's valuation was based on the plaintiffs expert testimony, and the appellate
court noted that plaintiffs expert was "actively involved in the sale of dental practices and the valuation of those practices." 384 N.W.2d at 115 (emphasis added).
In Kowalesky, the court stated: "[defendant's expert, a certified public accountant
who has a number of dentists as clients, did

25. Although not specifically stated by either party. Dr. Austin appeared to use in part a market
value methodology to value Dr. Sorensen's dental practice. A market value approach has been
cited with approval in other jurisdictions, see,
e.g.. In re Marriage of Hall 103 Washed 236,

jurisdiction, is the only acceptable methodology.
See Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 435
(Mo. 1987). Of the five methodologies, a market
value approach often produces the most conservative estimate for goodwill. 2 Valuation
and Distribution of Marital Property,

Dr. Austin further testified that the
goodwill value of dental practices in Utah
ranged from 15 to 80 percent of their gross
receipts. Accordingly, based on an analysis of the factors previously described, Dr.
Austin calculated a 34 percent factor for
goodwill and then reduced Dr. Sorensen's
average gross receipts by 66 percent The
34 percent goodwill factor was on the low
end of the 15 to 80 percent which he testified had been used by his brokerage corporation to value and sell other Utah dental
practices.
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not have similar valuation experience [as
plaintiffs expert]/' Id.

alimony and child support obligations to
appellant" Id. at 1309.

We find these cases analogous. Dr. Austin has considerable experience in the valuation and sale of dental practices. Conversely, Dr. Sorensen's experts both candidly admitted that they were not involved
in the sale and valuation of dental practices.

We are not persuaded that this statement from Dogu stands for the proposition
that accounts receivable may never he considered in the valuation of a professional
corporation. Dr. Sorensen has not, cited
additional authority for this proposition,
and we note other jurisdiction's commonly
hold that accounts receivable may be considered in the property distribution.2* In
fact, the Michigan Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court committed reversible
error by failing to consider accounts receivable in its valuation of a dental practice. Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich.
App. 151, 384 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1986).

Our able colleague in dissent takes a
novel approach to the review of expert
testimony. He goes even further than rejecting the expert found more credible by
the trial court and adopting another. He
gives his own "expert" opinion on the valuation of Dr. Sorensen's professional corporation, ignoring the testimony of all the
experts and the findings of the trial judge.
We think he simply believes that as a matter of law, the goodwill of any professional
association should not be valued and distributed in a divorce action. We believe
the overwhelming authority is to the contrary.
Based on the foregoing, we find the trial
court's valuation of the goodwill of Dr.
Sorensen's practice, relying on the testimony of Dr. Austin, was not an abuse of
discretion.
Accounts Receivable
[9] Dr. Sorensen claims that the trial
court improperly considered accounts receivable in the valuation of his dental practice. We disagree.
Dr. Sorensen relies on Dogu v. Dogu, 652
P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982). In Dogu, the trial
court excluded $25,000 of accounts receivable in its consideration of the value of the
defendant's
professional
corporation.
Finding the trial court had not abused its
discretion, the Utah Supreme Court summarily stated "[t]he corporation's accounts
receivable represent deferred income from
which respondent may meet his ongoing
26. See, e,g.9 Kopplin v. Kopplin, 74 Or«App. 368,
703 P.2d 251. 253 (1985) (trial court did not err
by discounting accounts receivable by 30 percent); In re Marriage of Reiling, 66 Or.App. 284,
673 ?2d 1360, 1365 (1983) (accounts receivable
are oroDertv to be included in the valuation of a

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the
trial court properly considered accounts receivable in its valuation of Dr. Sorensen's
dental practice.
Accounts Payable
[10] Dr. Sorensen claims that Dr. Austin's valuation, which was apparently
adopted by the trial court, failed to consider $10,129 in accounts payable. The record
is ambiguous on this point, but even if the
full amount of the accounts payable was
not considered, we find the error was
harmless.
Both parties to this action were awarded
approximately $131,000 in marital assets.
Property distributions in divorce actions
need not be "equal" but rather "equitable."
See generally Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d
695 (Utah 1985). "While equality is a worthy goal, precise mathematical equality is
not essential or required." Canning v.
Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 329 (Utah CLApp.
1987). Accordingly, we find that even if
the trial court failed to consider the full
amount of accounts payable in its calculations, such a mistake was harmless error
considering the total property distribution.
537, 538 (Colo.CtApp.1984) (accounts receivable
represent debts for services already rendered
and therefore constitute marital property); In re
Marriage of Goldstein, 120 Ariz. 23, 583 P.2d
1343, 1344 (1978) (trial court properly included
accounts receivable as a marital asset).
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Conclusion
Based on Dr. Austin's testimony, the trial court found that Dr. Sorensen's practice
was worth $100,000 which included tangible assets, accounts receivable, and goodwill. The trial court further found that
dental practices sell for approximately 90
percent of their value, hence $90,000 was
designated as the total value of the practice. The trial court then discounted this
figure to account for the time the parties
were married. The trial court found that
Dr. Sorensen had been practicing for sixteen years, and the parties had been married for approximately eleven and one-half
years. He further concluded the majority
of the goodwill value of the practice had
been established during the marriage.27
Thus, he reduced or multiplied 11.5/16 or
69 percent by $90,000 to arrive at $62,100,
the total value he assigned Dr. Sorensen's
dental practice as a marital asset
Having concluded, 1) the trial court properly considered accounts receivable and
goodwill in its valuation of Dr. Sorensen's
dental practice, and 2) that failing to consider accounts payable in its entirety was
harmless error, we find the trial court's
ultimate valuation of Dr. Sorensen's professional dental corporation is supported by
the record, and accordingly, the trial
court's valuation is affirmed.

of the request include, the necessity for the
number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the
difficulty of the case and the result accomplished, and the rates commonly charged
for similar services in the community.25
In the instant case, there is sufficient
evidence to demonstrate Mrs. Sorensen's
financial need. However, counsel for Mrs.
Sorensen concedes that no evidence was
offered regarding the "reasonableness" of
the attorney fees incurred to maintain this
action. Instead, Mrs. Sorensen's attorney
proffered an exhibit reflecting only the
time spent and the rates charged. Dr.
Sorensen's counsel stipulated that the proffer could be received, but expressly refused to stipulate to the "reasonableness"
of the fees. No evidence was presented
relating to the reasonableness of the number of hours, the usual hourly rate for
divorce cases in the community, nor the
overall reasonableness of the fee. See Talley, 739 P.2d at 84. Additionally, the
court's written findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as the decree of divorce, make no reference to the reasonableness of the fees. Accordingly, we find the
proffered testimony insufficient to sustain
the award of attorney fees, and therefore,
we reverse.
III. EXPERT WITNESS PEES

II. ATTORNEY FEES
[11,12] In order to recover attorney
fees in a divorce action, the moving party
must set forth evidence, 1) demonstrating
that the award is reasonable, and 2) establishing the financial need of the requesting
party compels the award.28 The relevant
factors for determining the reasonableness
27. Although the record does not conclusively
establish that the goodwill value of Dr. Sorensen's practice increased at a constant rate
throughout the marriage, there is also no controverting evidence establishing that it did not.
In fact, Dr. Sorensen presented very little credible testimony regarding the goodwill value of
his corporation. Based on the evidence before
the trial court, its method of apportionment was
not an abuse of discretion.

[13] Ordinarily, a trial court cannot require one party to pay the other party's
expert witness fees in excess of the statutory rate.* Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380,
1384 (Utah 1980). See also Frampton v.
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1980).
However, in this case the parties agreed by
pretrial stipulation to have their real prop28. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380. 1384-85 (Utah
1980); Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83. 84 (Utah
Ct.App.1987).
29. Kerr, 610 ?2d at 1384-85; Talley. 739 P.2d at
84.
30. Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4(1) (1988). provides
that "lejvery witness legally required or in good
faith requested to attend . . . [trial], is entitled to
$14 per day for each day in attendance and 30
cents for each mile actually and necessarily
traveled in going only."
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erty appraised by Mr. Heiskanan. They
further agreed that his fee would be paid
initially by Dr. Sorensen, with the ultimate
responsibility for payment to be determined by the trial court Stipulations are
conclusive and binding on the parties unless good cause is demonstrated warranting relief therefrom. Higley v. McDonald,
685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1984). Dr. Sorensen has not set forth adequate justification
to discharge his obligations under the pretrial stipulation. Simply because Dr. Sorensen did not agree with the appraiser's
valuation of the parties' real property, and
instead chose to hire additional experts,
does not constitute the requisite good
cause. We find no abuse of discretion and
affirm the trial court's allocation of the
appraiser's fee.
In sum, we affirm the trial court's valuation and distribution of the parties' property, and its allocation of expert witness fees.
We reverse the award of attorney fees.
GARFF, J., concurs.
JACKSON, Judge (concurring in part
and dissenting in part):
I dissent from Part I of the majority
opinion.
Why are my colleagues and others in the
legal system trying to create "new property" in the context of marriage dissolution?
Because of real and perceived injustices
and inequities in property settlements in
divorce decrees. As a result of their high
income production, professionals are prime
targets for the new, expansive definitions
of property that include: (1) advanced university degrees; (2) licenses to practice; (3)
equitable restitution; and (4) professional
goodwill. Proponents of "new property"
justify new definitions because they believe
those definitions provide the divorce system with additional means to be fair.
STATUS OF THE "NEW
PROPERTY" IN UTAH
In Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237,
241 (Utah CtApp.1987), this court held that
"an advanced degree is or confers an intan-

cannot properly be characterized as property subject to division between the spouses."
We also stated it is proper to consider
advanced degrees or professional licenses
when determining a spouse's ability to provide support, because an advanced degree
is ordinarily an indicator of potential future
earnings.
But it is the discrepancy in their earning
power which is the basis for alimony, not
the discrepancy in their educations
Whether a spouse's ability to provide
support is the result of an advanced degree or professional license is irrelevant
to the analysis. The key is the spouse's
ability.
Id. at 243 (emphasis in original).
In Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238,
240-41 (Utah CtApp.1987), we reaffirmed
our holding in Petersen, but acknowledged
there will be situations involving advanced
degrees and professional licenses where an
award of non-terminable rehabilitative or
reimbursement alimony would be appropriate. See Petersen, 737 P.2d at 242 n. 4. In
my view, reimbursement alimony is a return on investment in one spouse made by
the financially supporting spouse. In contrast, rehabilitative alimony relates to lost
investment in one's self, resulting in lost or
lower future income stream.
The need for reimbursement is most pronounced in "threshold" divorces, where the
parties split up before the benefits of one
spouse's enhanced earning potential are realized. Like Rayburn, the instant case
does not involve a threshold divorce. Dr.
Rayburn acquired his medical degree before the parties married. Mrs. Rayburn
did not endure substantial financial sacrifices or defer her own education to assist
his education. She shared the financial
rewards of the degree for several years.
His income production brought considerable real and personal property into the marriage that was equitably divided.
Similarly, Dr. Sorensen acquired his degree, license, and dental clientele and
equipment six years before marriage.
Mrs. Sorensen contributed nothing to assist
him in those acquisitions; she made no
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shared his financial rewards for eleven
years and received considerable tangible
property in the divorce decree, plus alimony and child support If the facts had
warranted it, she could have been awarded
non-terminable rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony.
In another recent divorce case involving
a professional spouse, Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah CtApp.1988), the
majority followed Petersen and Rayburn
insofar as it held that a medical degree is
not property subject to valuation and distribution in a divorce. However, stating that
Mrs. Martinez's situation required "more
creative" analysis than the usual case,
Martinez, 754 P.2d at 76, the majority then
moved beyond rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony to create new property by
requiring an award of "equitable restitution" in addition to traditional alimony and
property division.1 See ia\ at 78. In a
footnote, the majority emphasized that equitable restitution would not be awarded
where the marriage lasted for many years
after receipt of the professional degree; in
such a case, sufficient assets would be
accumulated and an appropriate distribution to the requesting spouse would provide
a share of the economic benefits earned as
a result of the degree. la\ at 78 n. 10.
Equitable restitution, this new animal
not to be confused with traditional alimony
or property, was described by the Martinez
majority as "nothing more than an equitable sharing of the rewards of both parties' common efforts and expectations."
Id. at 78. As I stated in my dissent, the
effect of that decision is to unnecessarily
create a distinctly new and unprecedented
form of marital property. Id. at 82 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
The instant case is the fourth attempt in
Utah to create "new property" in the professional arena. My colleagues have cooperated by uncritically embracing a new definition equating "goodwill" with "reputation," discussed below. I agree that we
must strive for equity and fairness in divorce actions, but I do not agree with the
1. The Utah Supreme Court has granted Dr. Martinez's petition for a writ of certiorari tn rnnciH.

means they have chosen. Under our statute, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1988), equity can be achieved through non-terminable
alimony awards consistent with Rayburn
and Petersen. This method is preferable to
the judicial selection of new definitions of
property.
ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL
GOODWILL
Like many legal doctrines, that of professional goodwill as a marital asset divisible
at divorce had one of its earliest airings in
the California appellate courts. In Mueller
v. Mueller, 144 Cal.App.2d 245, 301 P.2d
90, 94-95 (1956), the Third District Court of
Appeal quoted what it believed to be the
"general rule" in 28 Am Jur. 808 that goodwill could exist in a professional practice or
business dependent on the personal skill
and ability of a particular person, but did
not adopt that rule. The authority relied
on in Mueller, however, focused on an actual sale of a professional practice. In any
case, the Mueller court disposed of the
case by assuming no goodwill could attach
to such a business and then holding that
the dental laboratory business at issue did
not depend solely on the divorcing husband's personal skill. Six years later, the
same court said—again in dicta—that the
value of a professional practice was property to be considered at marriage dissolution;
the appellant ex-wife had not even appealed
the trial court's failure to award her any of
the value of the respondent's law practice.
Brawman v. Brawman, 199 CaLApp.2d
876, 19 CaLRptr. 106, 109 (1962). Finally,
relying on Mueller and Brawman, the Second District Court of Appeal explicitly embraced the doctrine in Golden v. Golden,
270 Cal.App.2d 401, 75 CaLRptr. 735 (1969),
and stated the following rule:
[I]n a divorce case, the good will of the
husband's professional practice as a sole
practitioner should be taken into consideration in determining the award to the
wife
[I]n a matrimonial matter, the
practice of a sole practitioner husband
will continue, with the same intangible
er the issue of equitable restitution. Martinez v>
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value as it had during the marriage. Under the principles of community property
law, the wife, by virtue of her position of
wife, made to that value the same contribution as does a wife to any of the husband's earnings and accumulations during marriage.
Id. at 405, 75 Cal.Rptr. at 737-38. The
California cases involving professional
goodwill after Golden did not even argue
about whether goodwill can exist in a professional practice. Instead, they assumed
both that such goodwill could and did in
fact exist, and focused on how to put a
price tag on it E.g., In re Marriage of
Fortier, 34 Cal.App.3d 384, 109 Cal.Rptr.
915 (1973); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38
Cal.App.3d 93, 113 Cal.Rptr. 58 (1974); In
re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal.App.3d 577,
117 Cal.Rptr. 49 (1974). As discussed more
fully below, this shift in focus has two
unfortunate results: (1) the use of a broad,
new definition of "goodwill," only in the
professional practice context, that equates
it with personal reputation; and (2) the
assumption that goodwill exists in every
professional practice, relieving the requesting party of the burden of proving that it
exists.
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spousal support and denial of equal protection." Id. at 85.
EXISTENCE OF
PROFESSIONAL GOODWILL
Judges, like valuation formulas, are
leapfrogging over the threshold question of
whether goodwill exists at all in a particular professional business, moving directly
to the issue of what the value of that
goodwill is. The court in In re Marriage
of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175
(1984), takes a stab at existence first, valuation second, but ultimately caves in and
comingles the two issues:
Two areas surrounding the [factors relevant to valuation of goodwill, set out in
In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal.App.3d
93, 113 CaLRptr. 58 (1974) and adopted in
In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash.2d
324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979),] must be clarified: (1) the first step in evaluation [of
goodwill] under the Fleege factors is the
determination of the existence of goodwill and (2) several accounting or appraisal methods may be used by the trial
court in conjunction with the Fleege
factors.

Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Marriage Dissolution: Is it Property or Another Name for Alimony?, 52 CaliState
Bar J. 27, 82 (1977). The result, Lurvey
claims, is a "confusion of rules and methods for valuation, compounded by inconsistencies in logic and application and conceptual problems over possible duplication of

The Lopez court warned that evaluation of goodwill must be done with considerable care and caution. In carrying
out this warning the court instructed
that the trial courts should first determine if goodwill exists in a particular
practice. Not every professional business as a going concern necessarily has
goodwill. The Washington goodwill
cases to date have not recognized this
preliminary inquiry and we do so today.
Hall, 692 P.2d at 179 (citations omitted).
Unfortunately, the Hall court then states,
"This preliminary inquiry takes place during the general evaluation process. The
trial court must bear in mind that there
may be zero goodwill." Id. Thus, even
after Hall, the existence of goodwill is
going to be determined by a calculation or
formula determining whether it has a value; if it has a value, then it exists.2 "One

2. This approach, which begs the preliminary
question of existence, is similar to that adopted
bv the Arizona court in Mitchell v. Mitchell 152

ognition of the need for a two-step determination:
As a general rule, "the court should clearlv

Tracking the elevation of professional
goodwill from dicta to law in California,
one writer has summarized:
Thus in just 17 years . . . California
carried a passing quotation from a law
encyclopedia that goodwill now could be
sold as part of a professional practice, to
a clear acceptance, in Fortier, that professional goodwill was an asset accountable as property upon a hypothetical sale
at marriage dissolution.
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or more [approved valuation] methods may
be used in conjunction with the Fleege
factors to achieve a just and fair evaluation
of the existence and value of any professional's goodwill." Id. 692 P.2d at 180.
The Fleege factors referred to in Hall, 692
P.2d at 179, which are also the factors set
forth in Lopez, are the professional's age,
health, past demonstrated earning power,
professional reputation in the community
as to his judgments, skill, and knowledge3
and his comparative professional success.
But these are the factors outlined in Fleege
and Lopez as relevant to the valuation of
professional goodwill, not its existence.
See Fleege, 588 P.2d at 1138; Lopez, 38
Cal.App.3d at 109, 113 Cal.Rptr. at 68.
Thus, after this bit of sleight of hand in
Hall, Washington uses the same factors to
determine both that professional goodwill
exists and that it has some value. Then
the amount of that value is determined
with the aid of an expert who is to use one
of the five approved formulas. Accordingly, goodwill exists when a professional has
health, a financial track record, and reputa-

tion. Thus, every professional who does
not work as a salaried employee 4 automatically has goodwill because every professional has all or most of these factors.

goodwill, and if so, its value, and how it
arrived at that value." Poore v. Poore, 75
N.CApp. 414. 331 S.E.2d 266 (1985). However, because the trial court stated that it
utilized the gross fee approach advocated by
appellee's own expert, and the valuation was
reasonably supported in the record by expert
testimony, we find no error.

successfully completed, he would not have any
"new goodwill" as property to be divided upon
divorce, although his high income is virtually
the same.
The court in Hall reached this absurd result,
professing to see a distinction with a difference
between salaried and non-salaried professionals. Dr. Judith Hall, a forty-year-old professor
at the University of Washington, had received a
salary increase from $32,750 to $42,000 around
the time of the divorce. She was "widely published and enjoyfed] a reputation as one of the
10 top physicians in the nation in the field of
pediatric genetics
Numerous medical
schools across the nation ha(d] offered her employment with salaries up to $60,000." Hall,
692 P.2d at 176. The Washington Supreme
Court held, as a matter of law, that a salaried
employee such as Judith Hall cannot have goodwill. Id. at 178. But see L. Weitzman, The
Divorce Revolution 122 (1985) (suggesting the
California courts and others have already laid
the necessary foundation for finding "goodwill"
in salaried employees too). The Hall court apparently reached this conclusion because "only
the practicing professional has a business or
practice to which the goodwill can attach."
Hall, 692 P.2d at 178. Was not Judith Hall a
practicing professional? Did she not, like her
physician husband who worked for a professional corporation, also have health, reputation
for skill and knowledge, and comparative pro-

3.

Fleege states that the value of professional
goodwill can be determined based partially on
the professional's "reputation in the community
for judgment, skill, and knowledge." Fleege,
588 P.2d at 1138. But the case it cites as authority for the elements engendering goodwill. In re
Estate of Giant, 57 Wash.2d 309, 356 ?2d 707,
709 (1960), involved Pacific Iron and Metal
Company, a business partnership, and referred
only to "reputation for honesty and fair dealing."

4. Significantly, the primary reason Dr. Sorensen
would have the "new goodwill" is because he
elected to work for himself as a non-salaried
professional rather than work for someone else
for a salary. For example, assume a lawyer in
solo practice who has five winnable wrongful
death cases on hand. When he wins or settles
those cases, the "new goodwillers" attribute
goodwill to him because he will have excess
earnings above what the average salaried lawyer
makes. However, if he were to take his cases to
another lawyer or firm, turn them over, and
aeree to work on them for a hi«rh « l a n / until

My colleagues in this case adopt the California and Washington approach and make
the same unfortunate mistake. Their position, boiled down, is that a non-salaried
professional person's reputation is "goodwill" and, therefore, property. Failing to
discern the necessity of a preliminary factual finding, based on supportive evidence
in the record, that such professional goodwill exists, the majority opinion jumps right
into valuation of Dr. Sorensen's dental
practice.
In California, the professional goodwill
doctrine found its roots in dicta. Here, my
colleagues think they have found identical
roots in dicta in Gardner v. Gardner, 748
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). In Gardner, however, Justice Stewart was concerned that
the parties' experts had failed to address
the goodwill of an established business or-
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ganization, the Ogden Clinic, not the personal reputation of Mr. Gardner
The Ogden Clinic, of which Mr. Gardner is a member, is a well-entrenched
institution, whose twenty-three members
have banded together in a business organization. It is not likely to be highly
susceptible to earnings interruptions because of the ill health of one of its members. The Ogden Clinic is not entirely
valueless.... Mrs. Gardner's accountants value the business much higher
[than Mr. Gardner does]. Neither gave
consideration to the good will inherent in
the professional clinic
Id. at 1080 (footnote omitted). The footnote to this text also clearly refers to goodwill as an asset of a business, not of a
person. 4The ability of a business to generate income from its continued patronage
is commonly referred to as good will." Id.
at 1080 n. 1.
The twenty-three member Ogden Clinic
is the perfect contrast to Dr. Sorensen's
one-man dental practice, which is highly
susceptible to earnings interruptions from
many causes. Moreover, when well, he can
work only so many hours a day and that is
the end of his production. His opportunities to increase earnings are negligible.
As the court in Gardner seems to recognize, traditional nonlegal definitions of
goodwill focus on it as the asset of a business, not of an individual. The goodwill
concept used by accountants focuses on its
measurement through a deductive process,
not on its nature. Parkman, The Treatment of Professional Goodurill in Divorce
Proceedings, 18 Fam.L.Q. 213 (1984).
Thus, their criteria for goodwill are aimed
at something that can be measured, such
as excess earning power or payments made
in excess of an established value of a resource. Id. To economists, the value of an
5. Professor Allen Parkman, an economist and
lawyer who teaches at the University of New
Mexico's Anderson School of Management, attributes the confusion in the case law to the lack
of any focus on a clear definition of goodwill,
which the majority opinion in this case shares.
The courts can obviously define terms in a
manner that differs from their meaning in
accounting and economics. However, if they

asset depends on the future profits it can
produce. Thus, the economic concept of
goodwill focuses on the fact that an established business can make greater profits
than new businesses because of its internal
and external relationships; once the revenue produced by these relationships is capitalized, it can be viewed as an asset of the
business, i.e., goodwill. Id. at 214.
In contrast, the legal concept of goodwill
focuses on the idea that it is an asset
which generates excess earnings. Because the legal concept has not been
fitted into the existing accounting and
economic framework, however, experts
have had a difficult time applying the
concept In particular, the legal concept
does not clearly differentiate between excess returns to individuals and excess
returns to businesses. This confusion is
especially noticeable in the case of professional practices.
In both the accounting and economic
literature, goodwill is an asset of a business based on earnings in excess of normal profits. It is based on the intangible, but generally marketable, existence
in a business of established relations
with employees, customers, and suppliers. The same analysis would not view
goodwill as being reflected in an individual. If excess profits of a business are
attributable to an individual, that individual should be able to capture that value
in higher wages. It would be appropriate to view personal attributes as "reputation" rather than as "goodwill." By
using reputation and goodwill interchangeably, the courts have created a
confused situation in the evaluation of
professional businesses.
Id. at 215.5
In a professional practice, goodwill can
exist in the business, but not in the individthen turn to these fields for an evaluation,
they have to realize the confusion that is going to be created. If the courts say that there
is goodwill in a sole practice, when there is
none from an accounting or economic perspective, a problem of evaluation is created.
It is like saying that an apple is an orange and
then, even in the face of protests from an
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ual practicing the profession. A large professional business organization can have
substantial goodwill. The Ogden Clinic fits
the example of such an organization given
by Parkman. See id. at 216. It does not
have any one professional's name directly
associated with it; patients come not because of any particular individual professional, but because of their own needs and
the clinic's past delivery of high quality
service. If that clinic sold for a price
greater than the value of its tangible assets, the value of that excess, goodwill,
would not be based on the presence at the
clinic of any particular employee or professional.
Dr. Sorensen's solo dental practice fits
Parkman's example, at the other extreme,
of the limited opportunities for goodwill in
a small professional practice, even one that
is smoothly operated. See id. His patients
come because of high quality service. He
has a few employees, but equally qualified
people are readily available. Patients
would not necessarily return to his office
location just because they had gone to a
doctor there before. A new doctor would
not pay for his practice much in excess of
the value of his tangible assets and accounts receivable.
By distorting the original definition of
business goodwill to equate it with such
subjective factors as personal reputation in
the professional practice context, the majority's decision, like the cases it relies on,
fabricates the existence of goodwill as as
asset belonging to every non-salaried professional, whether in a solo practice, partnership, or professional corporation. I believe an objective threshold standard for
determining the existence of goodwill must
be enunciated.
agricultural expert, asking for an analysis of
the apple's citrus content.
Parkman, The Treatment of Professional Goodwill in Divorce Proceedings, 18 Fam.L.Q. 213,
216 (1984).
6. Even this "past sales" method of valuing professional goodwill has been criticized as subject
to manipulation and not necessarily accurate,

ANALYSIS OF VALUATION METHODS
AND FORMULAS APPLIED TO
"NEW" GOODWILL
The majority asserts that the valuation
procedure employed by Dr. Austin, Mrs.
Sorensen's expert, is one commonly used
by his brokerage firm and is also consistent
with methodologies recognized and approved in other jurisdictions. But they are
not sure about the method he employed:
"Although not specifically stated by either
party, Dr. Austin appeared to use in part a
market value methodology to value Dr.
Sorensen's dental practice. A market value approach has been cited with approval in
other jurisdictions, see, e.g., In re Marriage
of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175,180
(1984)...." Footnote 25,supra. Actually,
Dr. Austin used his own gross revenue
capitalization formula and merely labeled
his method a "market value" approach.
Gross revenue formulas automatically attribute goodwill to every professional because every professional has revenue.
In Hall, the Washington Supreme Court
approved five professional goodwill valuation methods, including three capitalization
formulas based on capitalization of net
profits, not of gross revenue. In this case,
Austin did not use the market value method, described by the court in Hall as follows:
The fourth method, the market value
approach, sets a value on professional
goodwill by establishing what fair price
would be obtained in the current open
market if the practice were to be sold.
This method necessitates that a professional practice has been recently sold,
is in the process of being sold or is the
subject of a recent offer to purchase.
HalU 692 P.2d at 180 (emphasis added).*
Thus, although Hall approves only a
market value approach based on a current
Property § 23.05[2J(a) at 23-66 (J. McCahey ed.
1988), prompting some courts to insist on the
use of accounting formulas that capitalize excess earnings. These, however, have their own
faults, including the problem of estimating a
consistent "normal" return on tangible assets by
which to measure "excess" earnings and the
broad leeway given to the appraiser to choose a
capitalization rate. Id. § 29.05[3][c] at 29-44,
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sale of the particular practice at issue, Austin used a past sales approach that only
involved six sales of other practices, sales
generated by his appraisal firm at prices
created by its methods. The number of
sales (two each year for three years) is too
few to establish any market and none were
in the vicinity of Roy, Utah or Weber County, Utah. They are too remote in both time
and place to be reliable indicators of the
value of any goodwill in Dr. Sorensen's
practice.
Unlike the majority, I believe courts
should not be hoodwinked into accepting
the valuation testimony offered by one party or the other, just because one sounds
more credible than the other. If both experts are out in left field, the court should
ignore them or require counsel to provide
the proper data and analysis.
FAILURE TO DETERMINE WHETHER
THE PROFESSIONAL'S CAREER
ASSET WAS ACQUIRED BEFORE
MARRIAGE
Even if there was evidence in this case
on which to base a finding that goodwill
exists in Dr\, Sorensen's dental practice,
and even if there was credible evidence to
support the value of that goodwill, there is
It is important to note that there is a great
deal of diverse opinion as to whether earnings
from a professional practice should be capitalized at all and if so, what rate is applicable.
Critics of the use of capitalization point out
that a generally accepted accounting and appraisal principle is that earnings are to be
capitalized only where it can be assumed they
will continue in the future. In the context of
a professional practice, therefore, a court employing the formula approach is, either directly or implicitly, placing a value on future
earnings and results. Yet, courts are, often
without adequate explanation, quick to point
out that they are not so doing.
la\ § 29.05{3][cl at 2*-46 (footnote omitted).
Often* the professional ends up paying for the
new goodwill with future earnings.
[Another] difficulty with these accounting formulas [for valuing professional goodwill] is
that the result may be inappropriately high
since factors other than goodwill may contribute to the excess income. For instance, if a
physician works 60 to 70 hours a week instead of the usual 40 to 50, the excess earnings
generated by this additional effort may be
attributed to goodwill.

one remaining flaw in the property distribution in this case. The trial court never
examined—and none of the evidence addresses—whether the intangible asset of
professional goodwill was acquired before
or after the marriage vows.
Here, the trial court did recognize a timing problem with the expert's valuation
methods. Mrs. Sorensen's expert did not
pay attention to the time when Dr. Sorensen acquired his reputation or "goodwill."
The court found that "[t]he only reasonable
way to value said practice is to proportion
it based upon the years the parties have
been married during practice." 7 There is
no evidence to support that finding. To
the contrary, there is evidence that virtually all, if not all, of the value of the practice,
including goodwill or reputation, was Dr.
Sorensen's pre-marital asset. Dr. Sorensen's evidence showed that, when adjusted
for inflation, net earnings from his professional services were essentially the same at
the time of marriage as at the time of
divorcee The number of his clients had
decreased. Thus, there was no increase in
the value of his goodwill or reputation during the marriage. Whatever it was and
whatever its value, it was Dr. Sorensen's
Comment, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing
Professional Goodwill as Community Property at
Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 Tul.L.
Rev. 313. 333-34 (1981) (footnote omitted).
7.

A question not yet brought before the
courts is the issue of the existence of pre-marital goodwill when the practitioner spouse has
married well after the commencement of his
practice. This could become quite significant.
For example, a professional who had been in
practice for twenty or more years could marry and then dissolve the marriage a short time
later. Presumably the value of the goodwill
accrued as of the date of the marriage would
be separate property and would form a sort of
basis. Only the goodwill accrued during the
marriage would be community property. Its
value could be determined by calculating the
difference between the value of goodwill as of
the date of dissolution and the value as of the
date of marriage. Since goodwill is not accrued at a constant rate, as are pension benefits, the application of a simple time-based
percentage formula to the value on the date of
dissolution would not suffice.
Comment, supra note 6, at 340 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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pre-marital asset, not a marital asset 8
Since Dr. Sorensen owned his career asset, his practice, and its "goodwill" prior to
marriage, that asset should be treated as
his separate property, to be awarded to him
at dissolution in the absence of exigent
circumstances faced by the trial court in
fashioning equitable awards of property,
support, and alimony, circumstances not
present here. See Preston v. Preston, 646
P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982); see also Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 310 (Utah
1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
CONCLUSION
In summary, 1 dissent from my colleagues' creation of yet another species of
new property through their broad redefinition of goodwill in the professional practice
context, and from their erroneous approval
of valuation factors and an unacceptable
valuation method as a substitute for evidence of the existence of goodwill, however
defined. Traditional alimony awards, plus
nonmodifiable rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony awards, where appropriate,
offer the best methods for achieving equity
and fairness in Utah.

to Mrs. Sorensen because there is no evidence to justify not returning it to Dr.
Sorensen as his pre-marital asset

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Thomas Eugene DAVIS, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 870221-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 21, 1989.

Even if I agreed with the majority's
analysis and disposition of the professional
goodwill issue, I would nonetheless vacate
the trial court's award of part of the value

Forgery arrestee sought return of
money seized from his person pursuant to
statute requiring prosecutor to return
property which is not needed as evidence
upon proof of ownership and lawfulness of
possession. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., refused order to return, and forgery arrestee
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J.,
held that: (1) State worked de facto forfeiture by retaining money for more than two

8. Another method of analysis, recently set forth
by Professor Parkman in a thought-provoking
law review article, better demonstrates that Dr.
Sorensen's income-producing ability was his,
not theirs. See Parkman, The Recognition of
Human Capital as Property in Divorce Settlements, 40 Ark.L.Rev. 439, 440-49 (1987). Dr.
Sorensen (or someone other than Mrs. Sorensen) made all the essential investments in the
skill and knowledge he has that permits him to
generate income in excess of the income he
could derive from his innate strength and intelligence. His investments in himself, which increased the expected future income stream that
would flow to him, were completed at least six
years prior to his marriage. Usually,
the greatest impediment to attaining access to
a professional education is probably not the
direct costs of the education, but the difficulty
of obtaining admission. The ability to gain
admission is the result of earlier human capital investments. After admission, the most
substantial cost of graduate education is
usually the income sacrificed by the student.

Id at 444-45. The current value of this income
stream, his human capital, is a personal asset.
See id at 440, 447. That asset has value precisely because it will produce a stream of future
returns. Id at 439-40 & n. 4. Even in a closer
case, where a professional married while still a
medical student, Parkman advocates treatment
of an investment in one's self as non-marital
property:
For a medical doctor, the major increase in
his future anticipated income stream occurs
when he enters medical school, because the
probability is very high that he will finish.
. . . [T]he critical investments had already occurred when the student entered medical
school
Under normal circumstances, the investment in human capital prior to marriage will
be so large and essential relative to the investment after marriage that an individual's human capital should be treated as separate
property.
Id at 448.

